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INTRODUCTION
In September 1976, Thomas and Allison Wilson acquired their single-
family home in Limeledge Estates, Marcellus, New York, for $54,250.
They put $9,250 down and borrowed the balance of $45,000 from Old
Line Savings Bank at eight and one half percent interest, giving the Bank a
conventional mortgage on the property. Two years later, in September
1978, the Wilsons defaulted on their loan and in early 1979 the Bank
began aforeclosure action, obtaining a judgment offoreclosure in July 1979.
The Bank posted notices of the foreclosure sale in three public places in
Marcellus and published the notices for four successive weeks in the legal
notices of the local newspaper. In August 1979 when the foreclosure sale
was held, the Bank was owed $52,000 (which included accrued interest,
unpaid real estate taxes, the costs of the foreclosure action, and attorney's
fees). The Bank bid $51, 800 for the property, leaving a deficiency amount
of $200.
The Bank made no attempt to collect the small deficiency from the Wil-
sons. In early April 1980 the Bank sold the home to an unrelated third
party for $60,000. Seven months after acquiring the property at the foreclo-
sure sale, the Bank thus recovered its entire investment of $52,000 and
made a profit of about $8,000. Under the current state of the law, the Bank
was entitled to retain this profit.
The foregoing report describes an actual mortgage foreclosure
and the subsequent resale of the foreclosed property.' The result of
this foreclosure by judicially supervised public sale, with all its statu-
tory formalities and requirements, 2 was that the mortgagee rather
than the mortgagor received the value of the property in excess of
the debt balance. If the Wilson story were an isolated exception in
the world of mortgage foreclosure, it would be of little interest to
scholars and legislators; however, the study reported here demon-
strates that profitable resale, as in the Wilson case, is relatively com-
mon. The current law of mortgage foreclosure apparently is not
producing its intended results, and this Article recommends further
examination and reform.
These recommendations are based on the results of an empiri-
cal study of all completed mortgage foreclosures in Onondaga
County, New York, occurring during 1979. 3 The study had two pur-
poses: to measure the frequency and profitability of resales of
properties purchased at foreclosure sales by mortgagees and to pro-
' Although the facts in this example are from public records, the names of the
mortgagor and mortgagee have been changed in the interest of privacy. The "Wilson"
case is file number 289 in Appendix A.
2 These requirements include, for example, commencing an action to foreclose on
the property, posting and publishing the notices, and holding a public sale. See infra
notes 88-98 and accompanying text. The published notice of the foreclosure sale in the
"Wilson" case is set out infra note 236.
3 All data for the study was gathered by August 1, 1984.
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vide a current picture of mortgage foreclosure based on the results
of this sample, so that proposals for reform may be tailored to the
realities of the marketplace.
The intended effects of our law of mortgage foreclosure are
clear: when a borrower defaults on a mortgage obligation, the
lender is entitled to foreclose on the property given as security.
Foreclosure involves court action,4 notice to the interested parties,
and advertisement of a public sale. The public sale is intended to
produce the best possible price to preserve any equity in the prop-
erty for the mortgagor or junior lienors. If the sale does not pro-
duce an amount sufficient to liquidate the debt, the mortgagee is
entitled to look to the mortgagor for a deficiency. This procedure
was long ago substituted for strict foreclosure, under which the
mortgagee merely took title to the property in exchange for the bal-
ance of the debt.5
Although the intended effects of foreclosure laws are clear,
knowledge of the actual effects is less certain. Much of what we be-
lieve is based on unsupported anecdotal evidence, 6 extrapolations
from reported cases, 7 and studies that are now about fifty years old.8
4 Foreclosure by a power of sale does not require court action. See infra note 94
and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Abbott, Some Basic Priority Problems in a Land Developnent Project in Missis-
sippi With Emphasis Upon Power of Sale Foreclosure Procedures, 50 Miss. LJ. 665, 680 (1979)
("It has been the experience of this author. . ."); Durfee & Doddridge, Redemption From
Foreclosure Sale-the Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 MICH. L. REV. 825, 833 (1925) (citing HAND-
BOOK OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 275 (1922)); Nelson, Deficiency Judg-
ments After Real Estate Foreclosures in Missouri: Some Modest Proposals, 47 Mo. L. REV. 151,
152 (1982)); Prather, Foreclosure of the Security Interest, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 420, 438 (noting
purported lack of value of deficiency judgment) (1957).
7 See, e.g., Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mort-
gage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 848 nn.31-33 (1980) (citing cases).
8 See Bridewell, The Effects of Defective Mortgage Laws on Home Financing, 5 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 545, 558 (1938) (reporting 1938 study by the HOLC); Carey &
Brabner-Smith, with Lansden & Sullivan, Studies in Foreclosures in Cook County, (pts. 1-4),
27 ILL. L. REV. 475, 595, 717, 849 (1933) (four-part article reporting results of 1932
empirical study "of mortgage foreclosure practices in Cook County," id. at 475) [herein-
after cited as Carey & Brabner-Smith]; REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITrEE ON
MORTGAGE MORATORIUM AND DEFICIENCY JUDGMENTS (N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 58, 1938)
(cited in Prather, supra note 6, at 452 n.90); Fairchild, Foreclosure Methods and Costs: A
Revaluation, 7 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1937) (citing Report of Investigation on Cost and
Procedure in Mortgage Foreclosure, Survey of Real Estate Laws [U.S.W.P.A. PROJECT No. 352
(1936)]); Skilton, Government and the Mortgage Debtor 1940-1946, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 119,
129 (1946) (reporting study of sheriff's sales in Philadelphia County from 1941 to 1946).
The foreclosure of security interests in personal property has received more recent
attention. See Shuchman, Profit on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession and
Resale, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20 (1969); Comment, Business as Usual. An Empirical Study of
Automobile Deficiency Judgment Suits in the District of Columbia, 3 CONN. L. REV. 511 (1971);
Note, I Can Get It For You Wholesale: The Lingering Problem of Automobile Deficiency Judgments,
27 STAN. L. REV. 1081 (1975).
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Descriptions of foreclosure by sale have varied through the years.
Some asserted that surpluses are more common than deficiencies, 9
while others believed surpluses are rare.10 While some observers
noted that bidders are plentiful in times of prosperity," others ar-
gued that mortgagees generally are the only ones to bid and
purchase.' 2 Some commentators posited that fair prices are not ob-
tained at public sales, 13 that mortgagees buy at nominal prices' 4 or
for the amount of the debt,' 5 that mortgagees collect deficiencies
and sell for more than the bid price at a profit,' 6 that mortgagees
either do not bother pursuing deficiencies' 7 or are unsuccessful in
that pursuit,18 and that mortgagees who purchase at foreclosure
sales always suffer losses.' 9
The study discussed in this Article confirms some of these con-
ventional beliefs and refutes others. The study shows, for example,
that third parties buy at foreclosure sales more often than previous
reports suggest and that such purchases are more likely to produce
surpluses than are purchases by mortgagees. The study also shows
that mortgagees rarely pursue deficiencies and that while on the av-
erage mortgagees lose money when they foreclose, many individual
transactions result in profitable resales. This report thus provides a
current look at the effects of foreclosure law and establishes a basis
for reform proposals.
Scholarly literature has occasionally recognized that the results
9 E.g., Brabner-Smith, Economic Aspects of the DeficiencyJudgment, 20 VA. L. REv. 719,
721 (1934).
10 E.g., McGovern, Forfeiture, Inequality of Bargaining Power, and the Availability of Credit:
An Historical Perspective, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 141, 152 (1979); Washburn, supra note 7, at
851.
11 E.g., Brabner-Smith, supra note 9, at 724.
12 E.g., Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at 833; Madsen, Equitable Considerations of
Mortgage Foreclosure and Redemption in Utah: A Need for Remedial Legislation, 1976 UTAH L.
REv. 327, 335 (1976); Madway, A Mortgage Foreclosure Primer, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 146,
170 (1974); Prather, A Realistic Approach to Foreclosure, 14 Bus. LAw. 132, 135 (1958);
Prather, supra note 6, at 452; Nelson, supra note 6, at 152.
13 E.g., Madsen, supra note 12, at 331; Comment, Mortgages-"Depression Jurispru-
dence"--Remaining Effects in Statutory Law, 47 MIcH. L. REv. 254, 257 (1948).
14 E.g., Washburn, supra note 7, at 848.
15 E.g., Nelson, supra note 6, at 152.
16 E.g., Washburn, supra note 7, at 849.
17 E.g., Nelson, supra note 6, at 152.
18 E.g., Prather, supra note 6, at 438; Washburn, supra note 7, at 850 ("mortgagees
often fail to collect deficiency judgments").
19 Local bankers and bank attorneys repeatedly expressed this sentiment to the au-
thor. These bank officials and their counsel, who work with mortgage foreclosures and
the management and resale of properties acquired in foreclosure, appear to sincerely
believe that "lenders always lose in foreclosures." This may be because, when taken as a
group, losses do outweigh gains, see infra notes 177-79 and accompanying text. Bankers
usually reacted with surprise at evidence of profits from the resale of foreclosed prop-
erty and characterized such profitable transactions as nonrecurring oddities.
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of foreclosure by sale are similar to those of strict foreclosure. 20
Several reported cases involved mortgagees who acquired land
through foreclosure and subsequently resold it at a profit.2' With
one recent exception, 22 however, a profitable resale by the mortga-
gee has been considered only as a factor that might prevent the col-
lection of a deficiency,23 rather than as a remediable injustice.
A full-scale history of the development of mortgage law is be-
yond the scope of this Article; however, some discussion of that de-
velopment will illuminate the purposes underlying the current state
of the law. Part I briefly reviews the history of the American law of
mortgages from its English antecedents to the present day. Part II
discusses the methodology used to gather and analyze information
for the study of 118 foreclosure sales occurring in Onondaga
County, New York, during 1979 and the subsequent history of the
foreclosed properties. Part III presents the results of the empirical
study, demonstrating the frequency and magnitude of profitable re-
sales and providing other data concerning mortgage foreclosures.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the results of the study and reviews avenues
for the reform of foreclosure law.
This Article concludes that in many ways, the present law of
mortgage foreclosure is not producing the results originally in-
tended, and that, while further empirical studies should be under-
taken to confirm the analysis presented here, reform of the law of
foreclosure is overdue.
20 See G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 335, at 703, n.48 (2d
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE]; Fairchild, supra note 8, at 5; Washburn, supra
note 7, at 848, 850.
21 E.g., Thompson v. Maslia, 127 Ga. App. 758, 195 S.E.2d 238 (1972) (upholding
trial judge's opinion that for purposes of determining deficiency, price at public sale
represents market value; price three months later irrelevant); Gordon v. Harris, 290
Mass. 482, 195 N.E. 744 (1935) (evidence of mortgagee's profitable resale insufficient to
block deficiency judgment against mortgagor); Schultz v. Mead, 8 N.Y.S. 663 (1890),
affd, 128 N.Y. 680, 29 N.E. 149 (1891) (upholding judgment for mortgagee in deficiency
action despite mortgagee's profitable resale).
22 Central Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Spears, 425 So. 2d 403 (Miss. 1983) (mortgagee's
resale at two and one-half times price it bid at public sale unconscionable; profit re-
turned to mortgagor).
23 See Washburn, supra note 7, at 889 (courts generally do not grant relief to mort-
gagor contesting a deficiency whose only evidence is that mortgagee has made profit on
property's resale); De Funiak, Right to Deficiency Judgment Where Mortgagee Purchasing at
Foreclosure Sale Has Later Resold at a Profit, 27 Ky. LJ. 410 (1939) (decisive factor in
whether to prevent collection of deficiency is fraud or unfairness in foreclosure sale, not
whether mortgagee resold property at profit).
854 [Vol. 70:850
1985] FORECLOSURE STUDY 855
I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE LAW
Throughout its development, the law of mortgage foreclosure 24
has taken a zig-zag path between the rights of mortgagors and those
of mortgagees as the problems and needs of first one group and
then the other were perceived as more pressing. 25 While the system
is intended to do justice by balancing the interests of mortgagor and
mortgagee, in practice, it falls short of that goal.
A. Historical Development in England
In fourteenth century England the dominant form of mortgage
was the conveyance of the fee to the mortgagee 26 upon the condi-
tion subsequent that if the mortgagor paid in full on or before the
due date, he regained his estate.2 7 Mortgagors were required to pay
24 For good histories of the development of foreclosure law, see 4 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 427-519
(1952); OSBORNE, supra note 20, §§ 1-21; G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 1.2-1.5 (1979) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrr-
MAN]; Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at 825-33; Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of the
Lien Theory, 32 YALE L.J. 233 (1923); McGovern, supra note 10, at 145-52; Tefft, The Myth
of Strict Foreclosure, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 575 (1937).
25 See 9 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 693
(1958); Madway, supra note 12, at 148 ("For six hundred years mortgagor and mortga-
gee have sat at opposite ends of a see-saw, with the chancellor balanced nimbly at the
fulcrum, throwing his weight first one way, then the other."); Prather, supra note 12, at
132 ("And true to tradition, the courts, as well as the legislatures and legal draftsmen,
have zigzagged between the opposite poles of lender and borrower favoritism, adding a
safeguard here and a rectification there."); Vaughan, Reform of Mortgage Foreclosure Proce-
dure-Possibilities Suggested by Honeyman v. Jacobs, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 957, 958 (1940)
("Whereas economic conditions and the concomitant policy considerations may at one
time require that the interests of one party be advanced, and this necessarily to the
detriment of the other, similar dictates at another period prompt the court to swing the
balance in the opposite direction."); Comment, Connecticut Mortgage Foreclosure: Deficiency
Judgments and Problems of Subsequent Encumbrancers, 2 CONN. L. REv. 413 (1969-70) (de-
scription of changes in law).
26 See OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 5, at 8; OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note
24, § 1.2, at 5. In the early stages of mortgage development, the mortgagee often had
possession of the property as well as legal title. 3 R. POWELL & P. Ro, AN, THE LAw OF
PROPERTY 438, at 547 (1984) [hereinafter cited as POWELL & ROHAN]. See also Madway,
supra note 12, at 148. The mortgagee took possession because of the "abhorrence of the
church of the practice of charging interest .... The pious Christian lender was forced
to take possession of the property so that he could reap the rents and issues as recom-
pense for his money lent." 9 G. THOMPSON, supra note 25, at 3. By the end of the
sixteenth century or the middle of the seventeenth century it had become common for
the mortgagor to retain possession, while the mortgagee had complete legal title to the
property. POWELL & RoHAN, supra, 438, at 547; McGovern, supra note 10, at 148.
27 The conveyance to the mortgagee was absolute on its face, even though its only
purpose was to secure the debt. This state of affairs was vigorously criticized by
Maitland, who wrote, "that is the worst of our mortgage deed. . . it is one long suppres-
sio veri and suggestiofalsi (suppression of the truth and suggestion of falsehood). It does
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on the day set,28 known as the law day;29 no excuse for late payment
was acceptable.30 Upon any failure to perform by the mortgagor,
"title was absolute in the [mortgagee] and the mortgagor had finally
and irrevocably lost his land." 31 The harshness of this rule led
mortgagors to seek relief from the courts of equity. At first equity
courts granted relief only on a special showing of fraud, oppression,
or the like.3 2 Equity soon recognized the injustice of the forfeiture
inherent in this situation. By the end of the seventeenth century,
equity routinely intervened to relieve the harshness of the common
law mortgage;3 3 all mortgagors could redeem their land, as a matter
of right, by tendering the amount due within a reasonable period
after the law day.3 4 Thus, courts created the equity of redemp-
tion,35 an equitable right of all mortgagors.3 6
While the equity of redemption relieved embattled mortgagors,
it created new hardship for mortgagees, who no longer knew when
their tides would be secure.3 7 To free mortgagees from the open-
ended threat that the mortgagor might redeem the property, equity
allowed mortgagees to petition for foreclosure. Foreclosure termi-
nated the mortgagor's equity of redemption;38 the mortgagee al-
not in the least explain the rights of the parties; it suggests that they are other than really
they are." (footnote omitted) F. MAITLAND, EQurrY 269 (1909).
28 OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 5, at 12; OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24,
§ 1.2, at 7; POwELL & RoIAN, supra note 26, 438, at 547.
29 OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 1.2, at 7.
30 See id.; Madway, supra note 12, at 148. Indeed, the mortgagor might lose his land
because the "lender [hid] in the woods all day in order to avoid receiving payment." J.
COOPER-HILL & M. GREENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON MORTGAGES AND REAL ESTATE
FINANCE 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as COOPER-HILL & GREENBERG].
31 OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 5, at 9; see also Vaughan, supra note 25, at 959 (noting
that under early law, "when the mortgagor failed to pay his debt on the due date, the
mortgagee's title. . . became absolute. ..
32 OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 6, at 13.
33 See OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 1.3, at 7; Madway, supra note
12, at 148. Osborne characterizes the intervention of equity as a sudden development
early in the seventeenth century. OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 6, at 13.
34 OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 1.3, at 7.
35 "And so, a new right was born: the right of the mortgagor to pay his debt even
after default, and in this manner to recover his property. This right came to be known as
the 'equitable right to redemption,' or the 'equity of redemption.' " Madway, supra note
12, at 148.
36 See A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE:
CASES AND MATERIALS 157 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as AXELROD, BERGER &JOHN-
STONE]; Madway, supra note 12, at 148. The mortgagor could not bargain away this right
either in the mortgage or in a contemporaneous agreement; this was known as the "pro-
hibition against clogging the mortgagor's equity of redemption." OSBORNE, NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 1.4, at 9.
37 See AXELROD, BERGER &JOHNSTONE, supra note 36, at 157; OSBORNE, supra note
20, § 10, at 20; OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 1.3, at 7; Madway, supra
note 12, at 148.
38 OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 8, at 17 n.44. See also OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN,
supra note 24, § 1.3, at 8.
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ready had legal title to the land, subject only to the right to redeem;
therefore, extinguishing that right left the mortgagee as the abso-
lute owner of the land.39 Rather than creating any new rights, "the
decree [of foreclosure] only professe[d] to close a door which equity
had before kept open ....
After foreclosure, the mortgagee was not obligated to account
to the mortgagor for any surplus value in the property;4' at the same
time, procedural obstacles effectively prevented the mortgagee from
collecting any deficiency.42 The foreclosure action left the mortga-
gee with clear title to the property and resulted, in effect, in the
mortgagee exchanging the debt for the land. This procedure is now
called strict foreclosure. 43 It was not known as strict foreclosure in
England,44 nor was it in any sense "strict." 45 Indeed, in England,
foreclosure without sale included so many safeguards to protect the
rights of mortgagors46 that mortgagees first sought "sales in lieu of
foreclosure" to protect their position.47 Foreclosure by sale devel-
oped slowly in England and was not generally available until the
39 See Brabner-Smith, supra note 9, at 720-21 & n.2 (title to property absolute in
mortgagee and mortgagor is entirely divested of his interest in premises if proceeding
finds mortgage debt unpaid); McGovern, supra note 10, at 145 (strict foreclosure as cur-
rently recognized).
40 1 C. WILTSIE, REAL PROPERTY MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE § 2, at 10 (5th ed. 1939);
Goodman v. White, 26 Conn. 316, 321 (1857).
41 Brabner-Smith, supra note 9, at 720 n.2.
42 The deficiency judgment as such was unknown in the early stages of English
mortgage law. See id. at 719; Vaughan, supra note 25, at 961. The mortgagee could sue
on the debt if the value of the foreclosed property was insufficient to satisfy it. Id.; Os-
BORNE, supra note 20, § 311, at 649. If the mortgagee opted to sue on the debt, this
action reopened the foreclosure and reinstated the equity of redemption. If the mortga-
gee sold the property after foreclosure, he could not sue on the debt. Id. at 649-50;
Tefft, supra note 24, at 586. As a result, mortgagees who foreclosed had no effective
means of collecting deficiencies, even if the value of the land was insufficient to satisfy
the debt.
43 Brabner-Smith, supra note 9, at 720 & n.2; Madway, supra note 12, at 148. It is
interesting that strict foreclosure developed as a historical accident, growing out of the
fourteenth century form of mortgage as a conveyance of title to the mortgagee. Strict
foreclosure, in turn, led to the development of the equity of redemption, and eventually
to the development of the foreclosure of the equity of redemption. See Comment, supra
note 25, at 413-14; supra text accompanying notes 26-40.
44 See OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 312, at 652-53 (noting the differences in terminol-
ogy regarding foreclosures in the United States and England); Tefft, supra note 24, at
577 (accord).
45 Tefft, supra note 24, at 577.
46 The early foreclosure proceeding was slow and costly. Typically, many months
passed before entry of a decree, followed by an accounting. After the accounting, the
mortgagor routinely received an additional six months in which to redeem. Courts
sometimes permitted further extensions, and sometimes reopened the final decree.
Since even a purchaser from the mortgagee might be subject to the reopening of the
final decree, the mortgagee's title obtained through foreclosure was not marketable. See
OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 311, at 648-49; Tefft, supra note 24, at 577-79.
47 See McGovern, supra note 10, at 151; Tefft, supra note 24, at 579-80.
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middle of the nineteenth century.48
B. Historical Development in the United States
Although the American colonies initially embraced English
mortgage law, 49 the law governing mortgages in this country soon
developed its own characteristics. In this country, foreclosure with-
out sale quickly earned the epithet of "strict foreclosure" because it
proved to be unduly harsh on mortgagors.5 0 Foreclosure by sale
received a warm reception5 for several reasons. First, the remedy
of strict foreclosure was much more summary here than in England
because American courts operated with greater efficiency than their
English counterparts. 52 American judges showed little regard for
the rights of mortgagors and rarely granted the extensions and de-
lays that had protected English mortgagors. 53 Second, rapid and
extreme fluctuations in land values made strict foreclosure particu-
larly harsh.54 Finally, because strict foreclosure cuts off the equity
of redemption and leaves the mortgagee's title to the property un-
fettered, it is inconsistent with a theory in which the mortgagee's
interest is limited to a lien on the property.5 5 The widespread ac-
ceptance of the lien theory of mortgages56 consequently contributed
to the rise of foreclosure by sale and the decline of strict foreclo-
sure.57 By the early 1800s, foreclosure by sale was firmly established
as the primary method of foreclosure in this country. 58
48 See Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at 827; McGovern, supra note 10, at 150-
51; Tefft, supra note 24, at 580.
49 OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 13, at 23; Lloyd, supra note 24, at 240; Tefft, supra note
note 24, at 588.
50 OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 312, at 652-53; Tefit, supra note 24, at 577.
51 Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at 828.
52 OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 312, at 652; Tefit, supra note 24, at 588.
53 OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 312, at 652; Tefit, supra note 24, at 588.
54 OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 312, at 652; Tefit, supra note 24, at 588.
55 OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 312, at 653.
56 Three theories of mortgage law are extant in the United States: the title theory,
under which the mortgagee retains title until the mortgage is satisfied or foreclosed; the
lien theory, under which the mortgagee holds a security interest and no title; and the
intermediate theory, under which the mortgagor has the right to possession until default
and the mortgagee has that right after default. See OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 24, § 1.5, at 10; Madway, supra note 12, at 149; Prather, supra note 6, at 450-51.
Even in states that embrace the title theory, it is acknowledged that the mortgagee has
only a security interest. OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 24, § 1.5, at 10; Pow-
ELL & ROHAN, supra note 26, 439, at 549-52; Madsen, supra note 12, at 327. The choice
of theory has few practical consequences. OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 24,
§ 1.5, at 10; Vaughan, supra note 25, at 980.
57 Another reason foreclosure by sale developed more rapidly in the United States
than in England may be the relative lack of sentimental inclination to keep land in the
mortgagor's family from one generation to the next. McGovern, supra note 10, at 151.
58 AXELROD, BERGER &JOHNSTONE, supra note 36, at 157-58; OSBORNE, supra note
20, § 318, at 661; Brabner-Smith, supra note 9, at 721; Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble:
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The substitution of foreclosure by sale for strict foreclosure was
based on compelling policy considerations. Under strict foreclosure
the mortgagee might acquire land far more valuable than the mort-
gage debt, a result considered harsh, oppressive, and unfair.5 9
Foreclosure by sale was viewed as a logical way6 0 of protecting the
debtor's equity in the property6 t while still allowing the mortgagee
to recover a deficiency judgment when the proceeds of the sale fell
short of the amount owed by the mortgagor.62 Furthermore, during
the early development of foreclosure by sale in the United States,
the high level of activity in the real estate market 63 justified the con-
clusion that competitive bidding would assure fair prices. 64 In the-
ory, public sales in such a market would reduce deficiencies and
Lender's Remedies Need an Overhaul, 31 Bus. LAW. 1927, 1936 (1976). In contrast to the
English practice, in this country the mortgagee is allowed to bid at the foreclosure sale.
OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 318, at 662; Friedman, The Enforcement of Personal Liability on
Mortgage Debts in New York, 51 YALE L.J. 382, 410-11 (1942); Madway, supra note 12, at
170; Tefft, supra note 24, at 589; Washburn, supra note 7, at 887. If the mortgagee is the
successful bidder, he receives the same title to the property as a third-party purchaser.
Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at 843; Washburn, supra note 7, at 887. Another
significant American development is the availability of the deficiency judgment. Os-
BORNE, supra note 20, § 318, at 662; POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 26, 462, at 696.50;
Friedman, supra, at 383 & n.8; Vaughan, supra note 25, at 961, 963 n.33. Traditionally,
the amount of the deficiency was conclusively determined by deducting the foreclosure
sale price from the debt balance. OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 318, at 662-63; Tefft, supra
note 24, at 594. The deficiency judgment generally was available in the same action as
the foreclosure. OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 333, at 699, § 334, at 700. The English
impediments to obtaining a deficiency, see supra note 42 and accompanying text, were
not adopted in this country. Tefft, supra note 24, at 594. If the sale of the property
produced more than the debt balance, the mortgagee had to account to the mortgagor
for this surplus. OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 10, at 21; Vaughan, supra note 25, at 963
n.33.
59 See OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 10, at 20; 2 C. WILTSIE, supra note 40, at § 919;
Bridewell, supra note 8, at 529; Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at 828; Lifton, supra
note 58, at 1936; Tefft, supra note 24, at 595; Vaughan, supra note 25, at 960; Washburn,
supra note 7, at 846, 851.
60 "With the establishment of the doctrine. . . that a mortgage is a mere security
for the payment of a debt, a breach of the condition for payment merely giving to the
mortgagee a right to proceed against the security, the natural remedy for such breach was
to sell the property and apply the proceeds thereof to the payment of the mortgage
debt." 2 C. WILTSIE, supra note 40, § 918, at 1466 (emphasis added). See United States
v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 368 (9th Cir. 1970) (Ely, J., dissenting); see
also Fairchild, supra note 8, at 4-5.
61 The mortgagor usually has some equity in the property at the outset because
lenders typically advance only a portion of the purchase price. Additional equity is gen-
erated by increases in the market value of the property and by debt service payments,
although the latter source does not add any significant equity during the early years of
the loan when the payments are mostly interest. See Washburn, supra note 7, at 850 n.41.
62 See supra note 58 for a discussion of the deficiency judgment.
63 Brabner-Smith, supra note 9, at 721.
64 Vaughan, supra note 25, at 963 n.33; Washburn, supra note 7, at 846; Comment,
supra note 13, at 257; Note, Redemption From Judicial Sales: A Study of the Illinois Statute, 5 U.
CHi. L. REV. 625, 626 (1938); Comment, Statutory Redemption: The Enemy of Home Financ-
ing, 28 WASH. L. REV. 39, 40 (1953).
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perhaps yield surpluses, which could be paid to mortgagors orjun-
ior lienors. 65
The theoretical attractiveness of foreclosure by sale soon be-
came tarnished by public sales that did not produce spirited bidding
and high prices. 66 During the economic depression of the 1820s, it
became apparent that the public was only willing to pay bargain
prices at foreclosure sales.67 Absent serious competitive bidding,
mortgagees usually were the successful bidders at foreclosure sales,
and they paid low prices. 68 In response to this problem state legisla-
tures began enacting statutory redemption laws. 69 These laws gave
the mortgagor the right to redeem the property for a specified pe-
riod of time after the foreclosure sale by paying the purchaser the
amount of his winning bid.70 Although one purpose of statutory re-
demption was to allow the foreclosed mortgagor another chance to
regain his property, 7' the primary intent of these statutes was to
boost foreclosure sale prices. 72 Theoretically, the mortgagee would
pay a higher price at the foreclosure sale because a low bid would
encourage the mortgagor to redeem the property, thus undoing the
foreclosure. 73 These statutes remain in force in about half the
states74 despite the fact that statutory rights of redemption are
65 See Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at 829; Nelson, supra note 6, at 163, 165;
Comment, supra note 64, at 40. See also Washburn, supra note 7, at 936-38 (discussing
underlying assumption in Uniform Land Transactions Act that both debtors' and credi-
tors' interests are best served by sale at highest possible price). In the early days of
foreclosure by sale in the United States, surpluses were more common than deficiencies
due to the rapid increase in property values. Brabner-Smith, supra note 9, at 721.
66 See Friedman, supra note 58, at 385-86; Comment, supra note 13, at 257; Note,
supra note 64, at 626.
67 See Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at 832; Skilton, supra note 8, at 129.
68 Madsen, supra note 12, at 329; Tefft, supra note 24, at 590; Note, supra note 64, at
626; see also Lifton, supra note 58, at 1937.
69 OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 307, at 637-39; Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at
834; Tefft, supra note 24, at 590.
70 There is considerable variety in the mechanics of statutory redemption among
the states that adopted it. See OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrmAN, supra note 24, § 8.4, at
537; Madway, supra note 12, at 149.
71 OSBORNE., supra note 20, § 8, at 17-18; Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at 839;
Brabner-Smith, supra note 9, at 722. A secondary goal may have been to allow hard-
pressed mortgagors to retain possession longer. OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 8, at 18.
72 OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 8, at 18; OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrmAN, supra note 24,
§ 7.16, at 469; Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at 840; Note, supra note 64, at 627.
73 "The key to understanding the statutory redemption right lies in the proposition
that the statute's operation is in the nature of a threat. When redemption is exercised, it
is thereby evidenced that the mortgagee has not bid adequately at the sale ... "
United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 368 (9th Cir. 1970) (Ely, J.,
dissenting). See also Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at 840-41; Washburn, supra note
7, at 931.
74 OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 8.4, at 537; Madway, supra note
12, at 149; Prather, supra note 6, at 432. New York State does not provide for statutory
redemption; therefore, it was not part of this study.
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rarely exercised 75 and despite criticism that their effect is the oppo-
site of that intended.76
While economic conditions during the 1820s focused attention
on the low prices paid at foreclosure sales, the Great Depression of
1929 created a different problem. Mortgagees were again making
foreclosure purchases at low prices and were then frequently using
those low prices as the basis to vigorously pursue deficiency judg-
ments against mortgagors. 77 This practice was perceived as an in-
justice78 that some asserted contributed to the continuing economic
depression.79 The courts provided some small measure of relief by
occasionally setting aside foreclosure sales on the basis of the inade-
quate prices bid.80 State legislatures authorized more effective relief
for mortgagors during this period. They enacted a wide variety of
antideficiency laws8 1 to protect mortgagors from losing their prop-
erty to mortgagees by foreclosure at depressed prices and then fac-
ing deficiency judgments measured by those prices.82 While a few
states have prohibited deficiency judgments entirely,8 3 a more com-
mon approach is to prohibit them when the foreclosed mortgage is a
purchase money mortgage8 4 or is by power of sale.8 5 Other states
75 Brabner-Smith, supra note 9, at 722; Lifton, supra note 58, at 1950; Prather, supra
note 6, at 432, 452; Washburn, supra note 7, at 854; Comment, supra note 64, at 42.
76 See Tefft, supra note 24, at 590 (statutory rights of redemption made it difficult to
perfect the purchaser's title in such a short period, and "almost invariably discouraged
strangers who might otherwise have bid for the property."); Comment, supra note 64, at
39 (statutory right of redemption greatly discourages persons other than the mortgagee
from bidding for the property).
77 Madway, supra note 12, at 150; see also OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 335, at 703.
78 Friedman, sura note 58, at 385-86; Madway, supra note 12, at 150.
79 Madway, supra note 12, at 150; Washburn, supra note 7, at 916.
80 See generally Vaughan, supra note 25, at 963-65; Washburn, supra note 7, at 855-
901. Judicial relief, however, was very limited. Mere inadequacy of price was insufficient
to overturn a foreclosure sale; to warrant judicial relief, the inadequacy had to be
"gross," or "so extreme as to shock the conscience of the court," Washburn, supra note
7, at 862-63, or coupled with fraud or other misconduct. See Nelson, supra note 6, at
157; Vaughan, supra note 25, at 963-64; Washburn, supra note 7, at 862-63. A later
profitable resale of the property by the mortgagee did not prevent the mortgagee from
obtaining a deficiency judgment. See generally De Funiak, supra note 23; Nelson, supra
note 6, at 157.
81 See OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 335, at 704; OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra
note 24, § 8.3, at 528; PowELL & ROmAN, supra note 26, 473, at 696.76(65)-(71); Lifton,
supra note 58, at 1941; Madway, supra note 12, at 150.
82 Madway, supra note 12, at 150; Washburn, supra note 7, at 843.
83 See OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 335, at 705 & n.61 (Ark. Laws 1933, act 57, held
unconstitutional in Adams v. Spillyards, 187 Ark. 641, 61 S.W.2d 686 (1933)); POWELL &
ROHAN, supra note 26, 473, at 696.76(66) (North Dakota forbids any deficiency judg-
ment on a note and mortgage executed after July 1, 1951).
84 OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrIMAN, supra note 24, § 8.3, at 530; Washburn, supra
note 7, at 916-17.
85 OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 24, § 8.3, at 529; Nelson, supra note 6,
at 154; Washburn, supra note 7, at 917-18. For other statutory techniques for limiting
deficiencies, see Nelson, supra note 6, at 154; Washburn, supra note 7, at 903-07, 917-30.
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continue to allow deficiencies but require that they be calculated us-
ing the fair market value of the property rather than the foreclosure
sale price. 86 Like the mortgage legislation of the 1820s, the Depres-
sion era antideficiency statutes have endured throughout mortgage
foreclosure law, remaining as part of the statutory scheme some fifty
years later, despite the many economic changes since their
enactment.8 7
C. The Present State of Mortgage Foreclosure Law in the
United States
The preceding summary of the history of American mortgage
foreclosure law suggests its present state. While specific methods
used vary among the jurisdictions,88 some generalizations emerge.
First, foreclosure by public sale is the most prevalent method of
foreclosure in this country.89 Most states do not permit strict fore-
closure.90 The few jurisdictions which do allow strict foreclosure9'
restrict it to protect the mortgagor.9 2
The two principal methods of foreclosure by sale are judicial
foreclosure and power-of-sale foreclosure.93 With the latter
86 Nelson, supra note 6, at 154; Washburn, supra note 7, at 907-16; Comment, supra
note 13, at 259. New York State's antideficiency legislation is of this type. Under the
New York statute, if a mortgagee wishes to preserve the right to seek a deficiency judg-
ment, he must request the judgment simultaneously with making a motion for an order
confirming the foreclosure sale. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs LAW § 1371(2) (McKinney
1979). The mortgagee must file the motion for an order confirming the sale and the
attendant motion for a deficiency judgment within 90 days of the foreclosure sale. Id.
Upon a motion for deficiency judgment, the court determines the amount of the judg-
ment, which is the amount due the mortgagee as of the date of the foreclosure sale,
including interest, prior liens, costs of the sale, etc., less the higher of the property's sale
price or its fair market value as determined by the court. Id. If the mortgagee does not
move for a deficiency judgment, the proceeds of the sale are deemed to fully satisfy the
mortgage debt. Id. § 1371(3).
87 OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 24, § 8.3, at 528; Nelson, supra note 6,
at 154; Washburn, supra note 7, at 843, 901.
88 OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 24, § 7.165, at 466.
89 Id. § 7.9, at 442.
90 Id. § 7.10, at 443. Although in most jurisdictions strict foreclosure is not usually
available to the mortgagee, it may be allowed under certain circumstances including
actions to (1) cancel installment land contracts, (2) declare absolute deeds to be mort-
gages, and (3) cure a defective foreclosure in which an interested party was not joined.
Id. § 7.10, at 444-45.
91 Until recently, strict foreclosure was available in Vermont, Illinois, and Connecti-
cut. Connecticut is now the only state to allow strict foreclosure by a mortgagee.
COOPER-HILL & GREENBERG, supra note 30, at 235.
92 For example, Illinois limited strict foreclosure to situations in which the prop-
erty's value did not exceed the total amount owed the mortgagee, the mortgagee was
willing to take the property in full satisfaction of the debt, and the mortgagor was insol-
vent. OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 24, § 7.10, at 443-44.
93 Id. § 1.4, at 9; COOPER-HILL & GREENBERG, supra note 30, at 234. Foreclosure by
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method, the sale is not judicially supervised. 94 Both methods re-
quire prior notice to the interested parties95 and a public sale,96 and
each method allows the mortgagee to bid at the sale.9 7 If the sale
produces a surplus, the statute generally requires its distribution to
junior lienors, with any balance going to the mortgagor.9 8 Subject
to any antideficiency protections, 99 the mortgagee usually can ob-
tain as a deficiency judgment the difference between the amount
paid at the foreclosure sale and the balance of the debt.100
Requiring a public sale and enacting statutory redemption laws
and antideficiency measures have the common goal of protecting
mortgagors' interests. The public sale, coupled with statutory re-
demption, is intended to protect the mortgagor's equity by produc-
ing the best possible price.' 0 ' Antideficiency statutes are designed
to protect the mortgagor from the double loss that results from los-
judicial sale is available in every jurisdiction and is exclusively or generally used in 24
states. OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 7.11, at 446.
Power of sale foreclosure is available in most other states. Id. § 7.19, at 475. Maine
is the only state in which neither foreclosure method is predominant. See Committee on
Mortgage Law and Practice, Cost and Time Factors in Foreclosure of Mortgages, 3 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TAXJ. 413, 421 (1968).
94 COOPER-HILL & GREENBERG, supra note 30, at 234-35; Madsen, supra note 12, at
329.
95 OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 7.16, at 468, § 7.19, at 475-76.
The notice requirements are generally less rigorous in power-of-sale foreclosures. Id.
§ 7.19, at 475.
96 COOPER-HILL & GREENBERG, supra note 30, at 234-35; OSBORNE, NELSON &
WHrrmAN, supra note 24, § 1.4, at 9; Madsen, supra note 12, at 329.
97 See supra note 58; see also Donaldson v. Mansel, 615 S.W.2d 799, 802 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1980), reh'g denied (1981) (mortgagee may purchase at foreclosure sale he conducts
under deed of trust); Moreland v. Marwich Ltd., 629 P.2d 1095, 1097 (Colo. Ct. App.
1981), reh'g denied (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 665 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1983) (en banc)
(mortgagee can bid amount of debt and, if not seeking deficiency, need not bid fair
market value).
98 OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 24, § 7.31, at 519-21; see infra notes
150-51 and accompanying text.
99 See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
100 OSBORNE, NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 24, § 8.1, at 525.
101 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. Junior lienors also would benefit if
a higher price were produced because they share in any amount generated at the sale in
excess of the senior mortgage debt being foreclosed. See Durfee & Doddridge, supra
note 6, at 829; Nelson, supra note 6, at 163. The junior mortgagee is left with only a
personal claim against the mortgagor if the sale does not produce enough to satisfy his
debt because the sale extinguishes the junior security interest. POWELL & ROHAN, supra
note 26, 463, at 696.64-65 (junior mortgagee must be joined in foreclosure action); 10
G. THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 5172, at 187-88, 190 (although foreclosure sale pur-
chaser receives title of mortgagor as of making mortgage, together with any infirmity
upon the title, purchaser obtains by estoppel all junior interests). Thejunior mortgagee
is further disadvantaged if he buys at the sale to protect his interest, in that he must pay
cash for the property, thus increasing his investment. The senior mortgagee can bid up
to the amount of his debt without parting with any cash. COOPER-HILL & GREENBERG,
supra note 30, at 234; Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 6, at 840; Washburn, supra note 7,
at 849.
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ing his property to a mortgagee for less than its worth and facing a
deficiency judgment based on that depressed price.' 0 2 These statu-
tory protections disregard the possibility that the mortgagee may
purchase the property at the foreclosure sale, forego any claim to a
deficiency and then quickly resell the property for enough both to
pay off the debt balance and to make a profit.
Despite judicial recognition of such profitable resales, 10 3 courts
have upheld both foreclosure sales and deficiency judgments. 10 4 In
only one reported case has the mortgagor recovered the profit real-
ized by a mortgagee who bought at foreclosure and quickly resold
the property. In Central Financial Services, Inc. v. Spears,10 5 the
Supreme Court of Mississippi upheld an order compelling a mortga-
gee to account to the mortgagor for a profit the mortgagee realized
on resale of the property. The mortgagee purchased the property at
the foreclosure sale for $1,458, the amount of the debt. 10 6 It then
sold the property twelve days later to an unrelated third party for
$4,000, realizing a profit of $2,481.107 In an action by the mortga-
102 OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 8.3, at 528; Washburn, supra
note 7, at 849-51, 889.
103 See cases cited supra note 21.
104 See Smith v. Black, 115 U.S. 308 (1885) (foreclosure sale upheld); Thompson v.
Maslia, 127 Ga. App. 758, 195 S.E.2d 238 (1972) (same); Gordon v. Harris, 290 Mass.
482, 195 N.E. 744 (1935) (same); Triplett v. Bridgforth, 205 Miss. 328, 38 So. 2d 756
(1949) (same); Haines v. Twelfth Ward Bank, 162 A.D. 164, 147 N.Y.S. 254 (1914), afd,
220 N.Y. 751, 116 N.E. 1049 (1917) (deficiency judgment upheld); Schultz v. Mead, 29
N.Y. Sup. Ct. 203, 8 N.Y.S. 663 (1890), aff'd, 128 N.Y. 680, 29 N.E. 149 (1891) (same);
Allison v. Allison, 88 Va. 328, 13 S.E. 549 (1891) (same); see also Friedman, supra note 58,
at 385 (even before Depression, courts recognized that judicial sales failed to attract
bidders).
Courts allowed profitable resales on the theory that the date of the foreclosure sale
was the relevant date for measuring the rights of the parties, and either the foreclosure
sale price or the fair market value on that date was the correct measure of the right to a
deficiency. See Washburn, supra note 7, at 868, 873, 889-90 (courts refuse to use resale
price as barometer of property value because of potential for distortion by extrinsic fac-
tors). Moreover, it was sometimes argued that the mortgagee who bought at the sale
should be treated like a third-party buyer and should not be penalized because he later
made a profitable resale of the property. See id. at 887, 890. As a result, even where a
subsequent profitable resale occurred, deficiencies often were permitted and foreclosure
sales upheld unless there was either gross inadequacy in the price obtained at foreclo-
sure or a defect, such as fraud, in the foreclosure sale. See Nelson, supra note 6, at 157;
Washburn, supra note 7, at 860-63; see also Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Adam Schu-
mann Assoc., 150 Misc. 221, 268 N.Y.S. 674 (Sup. Ct. 1934) (deficiency judgment set
aside due to grossly inadequate foreclosure sale price); Union Joint Stock Land Bank v.
Knox County, 20 Tenn. App. 273, 97 S.W.2d 842 (1936) (deficiency judgment over-
turned where mortgagee resold shortly after foreclosure for amount sufficient to cover
deficiency).
105 425 So. 2d 403 (Miss. 1983).
106 Id. The $1,458 included foreclosure costs.
107 Id. at 403-04. The mortgagee paid a $30 judgment lien on the property and
realized a profit of $2,481.14. About four months later, the third party sold the property
for a $2,000 profit over their $4,000 purchase price. Id. at 404.
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gor to have the foreclosure sale set aside, the court deemed the
$2,481 "windfall" profit' 08 realized by the mortgagee unjust and af-
firmed and modified the chancellor's order.10 9 Spears is the only
case" 0 in which a court has granted relief by requiring the return of
profits reaped by a mortgagee at the mortgagor's expense. Without
that relief, the foreclosure sale in Spears would have produced the
same result as strict foreclosure: an absolute exchange of the prop-
erty for the balance of the debt, with no duty to account for the
surplus value of the property.
The Spears court's finding that a profitable resale of mortgaged
property by the mortgagee constitutes unjust enrichment is sound.
Even in foreclosure, the mortgagor has a right to a fair price for his
property. The production of a quick resale profit strongly suggests
that the foreclosure sale did not produce a fair price. Since the re-
port of the empirical study that follows demonstrates that the profit-
able resale in Spears is not an anomaly, it appears that our law of
mortgage foreclosure is not working as intended and that prompt
reform is necessary.
II
THE EMPIRICAL STUDY: METHODOLOGY-DATA
GATHERING AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The goal of this empirical study was to present a current and
accurate picture of mortgage foreclosure and to measure the extent
of acquisitions and subsequent profitable resales of foreclosed
properties by mortgagees. The sample consisted of all mortgage
foreclosure actions begun in Onondaga County, New York, during
1979 that culminated in a confirmed foreclosure sale.11 ' One hun-
108 Id. at 405.
109 Id. The chancellor had calculated the mortgagor's recovery based on the fair
market value of the property, which he fixed at $6,000. The Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi reduced the recovery to the profit actually realized on resale. Id. See Comment,
Mortgages-Mortgagor's Remedies-Unconscionable Windfallfrom Resale of Security Immediately After
Mortgagee's Purchase at Foreclosure Sale Gives Mortgagor a Right to Damages, 53 Miss. LJ. 533,
535 n.12 (1983).
110 Spears is the only case in which this relief has been granted as a matter of state
law. In Fitzgerald v. Cleland, 650 F.2d 360 (1981), the First Circuit required the Veter-
ans Administration to return a profit of approximately $15,000 which it realized from
the resale of the mortgagor's property approximately three months after acquiring it by
strict foreclosure. Although the court felt it would be "unjust" for the creditor to retain
this profit, id. at 361, its order requiring the return of the profit to the mortgagor was
founded on the fact that both the federal statute and the Veterans Administration's own
regulations lacked any authority for the VA to retain the surplus money. In the absence
of any such authority, the court inferred an intent that ordinary property rules, which it
interpreted to favor the debtor, should apply. Id. at 362.
111 Although all of the foreclosure actions in the sample began in 1979, some of the
foreclosure sales did not occur until 1980. The sample does not include foreclosure
sales held during 1979 if the action was begun before 1979, nor does it include foreclo-
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dred and eighteen such transactions were identified and examined.
The year 1979 was chosen to allow sufficient time for accurate mea-
surement of the resale of the foreclosed properties because a major
part of the study involved reviewing the subsequent history of the
properties after foreclosure.
All information used in the study was derived from the public
record. Court and land records maintained by the Onondaga
County Clerk contained data concerning foreclosures and subse-
quent histories of the foreclosed properties. The records of the
County and City Assessment Offices showed whether the properties
were single-family, two-family, multi-family residential, or commer-
cial property. 112 Finally, the public index of bankruptcy filings
maintained by the United States Bankruptcy Court in Utica, New
York, was searched for each mortgagor in the study. Attempts to
examine the relevant records of a number of the bank mortgagees in
the study failed because the bankers who were approached refused
to disclose any specific information concerning their
foreclosures. 1 13
A. Data Gathering
The process of gathering the data was accomplished by the fol-
lowing seven steps.
1. Identification of All 1979 Foreclosure Actions
Two index books maintained by the county clerk identified all
foreclosure actions commenced during 1979 that resulted in ajudg-
ment of foreclosure and a foreclosure sale confirmed by the
court.1 4 From these indices, we found the names of the parties and
the numbers of the court files.
2. Examination of Court Files
After identifying the 118 completed foreclosures in the sample,
we reviewed the court file for each foreclosure. Each file consisted
of the pleadings from the initial Summons and Complaint through
sure actions that did not culminate in a sale. See generally W. COCHRAN, SAMPLING TECH-
NIOUE (2d ed. 1963) (for background information on sampling).
112 The assessment and real property tax records for all of Onondaga County except
for the city of Syracuse are maintained by the Office of the Commissioner of Finance,
Department of the Treasury, Onondaga County. Records for property located within
the city of Syracuse are maintained by the Assessment Office for the City of Syracuse.
113 The bankers interviewed in connection with the study declined to provide any
documentary information or permit inspection of their records.
114 The indices examined were entitled "Deposits With the County Treasurer" and
"Lis Pendens Index." Although most foreclosures were listed in the Deposits book,
some 1979 foreclosure actions were indexed only in the Lis Pendens volume.
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the final Order Confirming Report of Sale.1 15 The foreclosure files
provided a wealth of information, including the terms of the original
loan transaction, the description of the land involved, the amount
due as of the foreclosure sale, the identity of the successful bidder,
the amount bid, and a record of the surplus or deficiency generated
by the sale.
3. Deficiency Judgment Search
The General Index to Civil Actions and the Judgment Docket
showed whether the mortgagee had pursued a deficiency judg-
ment.11 6 These records also were examined to determine when
such deficiency judgments were obtained and satisfied.
4. Prior and Subsequent Histories of the Properties
The Grantor, Grantee, Mortgagor, and Mortgagee Indices lo-
cated the recorded deeds and mortgages relating to each foreclosed
property. In each case, we reviewed the deed by which the mortga-
gor acquired the property, any mortgages on the property, and any
deeds from subsequent resales of the property. These indices dis-
closed the dates of the acquisition and resale transactions, whether
an existing mortgage had been assumed, or whether the property
had been taken subject to a mortgage. Since most of the deeds re-
cited only a nominal consideration, we calculated the true consider-
ation based on the mandatory tax stamp. 117 These computations
show the sale prices within $250.118
115 The contents of a typical file included: Notice of Pendency of Action; Summons;
Affidavit of Personal Service; Verified Complaint; Affirmation in Support of Motion for
Appointment of Receiver; Order Appointing Receiver; Receiver's Oath; Receiver's
Bond; Affidavit of Receiver; Affirmation in Support of Receiver's Accounting; Order Set-
tling Receiver's Account; Order of Reference; Affirmation of Regularity; Referee's Oath;
Referee's Report of Computation; Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale; Notice of Sale;
Terms of Sale; Referee's Report of Sale; Order Confirming Report of Sale; and Affida-
vits of Notice.
116 To obtain a deficiency judgment, the mortgagee must file a motion within 90
days of the foreclosure sale asking the court to enter that judgment. See supra note 86.
117 At the time of most of the transactions in the study, the New York State real
estate transfer tax was 55 cents per $500 of consideration or any fraction thereof. N.Y.
TAx LAw § 1402 (McKinney 1975) (amended 1983). Thus, in a transaction in which the
true consideration was $12,275, the tax imposed would be $13.75 ($12,275/$500 =
24.55. Rounding the fraction up to 25, the final computation is 25 X $.55 = $13.75).
Working backwards, a tax stamp of $13.75 means the true consideration was between
$12,001 and $12,500. The amount of the tax is stamped on the face of the deed at the
time it is recorded.
118 In order to minimize any distortion of the data, we took the midpoint of the
range in each calculation of the true consideration. Transfer tax calculations on transac-
tions occurring before May 1, 1983, did not include the amount of any mortgage the
buyer assumed or took subject to, id.; accordingly, those amounts were added in where
they occurred. In 1983 the tax was increased to $2.00 per $500 of consideration and the
amount of an assumed or subject to obligation was no longer excluded from the tax
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5. Determination of Property Use
We reviewed the County and City assessment records for each
property and recorded the Property Type Classification Code for
each. The detailed codes" t 9 were aggregated into the categories of
single-family, two-family, multi-family residential, and commercial
property for purposes of the later analysis.
6. Bankruptcy of Mortgagor
We searched the Public Index of the United States Bankruptcy
Court located in Utica, New York, for the name of each defaulting
mortgagor and the filing date of bankruptcy petitions, if any. Most
Onondaga County landowners filing for bankruptcy would do so in
the Northern District of New York, and their filings would be in-
dexed in the Bankruptcy Court in Utica. 120
7. Special Cases
Twenty-nine foreclosures in the sample were on mortgages in-
sured by a government agency. 12 ' In each case the government
agency paid the mortagee the amount due on the mortgage debt
and substantially all of the costs associated with the foreclosure pro-
ceeding 22 and then took over the mortgagee's position as to the
base. N.Y. TAx LAw § 1402 (McKinney Supp. 1984). These figures were used for any
resales occurring after the May 1, 1983, effective date of the change. Thirteen cases in
which the property was resold had to be excluded from the calculation of profits and
losses on resale because the transactions were exempt from the real estate transfer tax,
typically because the sale was to a government agency or a charity. N.Y. TAx LAw
§ 1405 (McKinney 1975). This tax exemption made it impossible to determine the true
consideration paid in these transactions. Accordingly, these 13 resales were not in-
cluded in the calculation of the profits and losses on resale, see infra notes 167, 181, 187
and accompanying text. See also infra text accompanying note 177.
119 More than 200 individual codes are listed in a pamphlet entitled Property Type
Classification Codes, issued by the New York State Division of Equalization and Assessment
(May 1980).
120 The proper place to file for bankruptcy is determined by the judicial district in
which the bankrupt is domiciled during the six months prior to filing. 11 U.S.C.
§ II(a)(1) (1976), repealed by 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982). For a bankrupt domiciled in
Onondaga County, the proper place to file is the United States Bankruptcy Court in the
Northern District of New York. Within the district, the most logical location is the court
in Utica, New York. An occasional bankrupt might choose to file in the United States
Bankruptcy Court in Rochester, New York, which also is located in the Northern Dis-
trict. The index maintained in Utica includes the Rochester filings.
121 The three government insuring agencies involved were the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, the Veterans Administration, and the Small Business
Administration.
122 See OSBORNE, NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 24, § 11.2, at 654-57. Depending
on the agency involved, the actual amount paid to the mortgagee might be slightly less
than the debt balance. Id. § 8.11, at 555-56. For example, if a lender assigns the mort-
gage to the government, the Federal Housing Administration will pay 997o of the loan
balance and handle the foreclosure process by itself; under the claim procedure used by
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land and the debtor. 123
In three cases, buyers subsequently resold property purchased
at the foreclosure sale in smaller units. In these cases, we averaged
the individual resale dates to calculate the time between foreclosure
and later resales.
B. Data Analysis
After gathering the data, we constructed and analyzed a data
base using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) program package 124
on an IBM 4341 computer. Statistical summary measures, such as
the mean, median, variance, and standard deviation of the observa-
tions were calculated. 125 Confidence intervals and hypothesis tests
were used for some portions of the analysis. 126 The important char-
acteristics of each foreclosure and resale were manually plotted on a
map of Onondaga County to show any geographic patterns evident
in the sample.
the Veterans Administration, a ceiling is imposed on the payment to the mortgagee. In
most of the cases in the sample involving a government insurer, however, it appears that
the mortgagee recovered most of its investment through the insurance policy.
123 In 13 cases the government agency assumed the mortgagee's position by taking
an assignment of the mortgagee's successful bid at the foreclosure sale. In the remain-
ing 16 cases, the mortgagee purchased the property at foreclosure and promptly deeded
it to the insuring agency. There is no functional difference between these methods. The
government agency took over the position of the mortgagee under either method.
124 See generally SAS INsTrrrE INC., SAS USER'S GUIDE: BASICS (1982).
125 The mean is the average of all values in a given group. The median is the middle
value in the group. See D. BARNES, STATISTICS As PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS OF QUANTITA-
TIVE EVIDENCE 75-76 (1983). The median is not easily influenced by a few very high or
low values in the series and is thus a truer measure of the "central" value than the mean.
The mean is a better measure of the population average because it takes all values into
account. The variance and standard deviation are measures of how far the values are
distributed from the mean within the sample. Id. at 77-80.
126 A confidence interval is a statistical tool for predicting the characteristics of a
universe based on a sample drawn from that universe. It is expressed as a range within
which the true mean of the value in the universe is likely to fall, together with a state-
ment of the likelihood that the true mean does fall within that range. Id. at 235-36.
The confidence intervals presented in this Article were calculated using the normal
approximation method, except when its confidence fell below a level where it could be
guaranteeed (for example, where its confidence was 94.5% when 95% was sought). In
cases where the observed number was too small to calculate an accurate normal approxi-
mation with the given sample size, the exact Biometrika charts were used. See E. PEAR-
SON & H. HARTLEY, I BIOMETRiA TABLES FOR STATISTICIANS (3d ed. 1966).
A hypothesis test is a statistical method of assuring that observed differences are
larger than simple random fluctuations which one would expect even if there were no
true differences. Hypothesis tests were obtained from either corresponding confidence
intervals or from chi-square statistics. See generally E. DUDEWICZ, INTRODUCTION TO STA-
TISTICS AND PROBABILITY (1976).
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
III
RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
In this section the results of the data gathering and analysis dis-
cussed above are presented in narrative and graphic form. In addi-
tion, a table setting forth much of the data is presented in Appendix
A. The following section uses these results to analyze the workings
of the mortgage foreclosure process and to support proposals for
reform.
A. Summary of Results
Some of the major results of the study are broadly presented
here, followed by the detailed results on which they are based.' 27
Mortgagees purchased in about three-quarters of the foreclo-
sure sales; they resold the property within a year or less in seventy
percent of the cases where they bought at foreclosure. Mortgagees
made profits in about.half of the cases in which they purchased and
quickly resold the foreclosed properties. Two-thirds of these profits
were between $2,000 and $10,000. More than seventy percent of
these profits were made on the resale of single-family homes. More
than half the profits made by mortgagees who acquired and resold
single-family homes were greater than $4,000.
In the other half of their resales, mortgagees sustained losses,
two-thirds of which were between $2,000 and $15,000. Taking
profits and losses together, the average of all foreclosure transac-
tions produced an average loss to mortgagees of almost $14,000.
The entire foreclosure process resulted in the mortgagee being
made whole1 28 in forty-four percent of the cases.
Third parties bought at foreclosure about one-quarter of the
time.' 29 Some third parties may have bought foreclosed single-fam-
ily homes as residences, rather than as investments. There are con-
tradictory indications about whether third parties use foreclosure as
an opportunity to speculate and turn quick profits; there is some
evidence they may buy the best properties, leaving the abused or
neglected properties for mortgagees to purchase. 130
More than half of the foreclosure sales to third parties, but only
127 Throughout this report, all percentages have been rounded off to the nearest
whole number; observations and calculated values have generally been rounded off to
the nearest $100.
128 The mortgagee is made whole when it recovers the full amount of the debt bal-
ance and any additional costs to which it is entitled by law, either at the foreclosure sale
or by a later resale of the property.
129 This is significantly more than had previously been reported. Other authorities
report that the mortgagee is generally the only bidder. See supra note 12.
130 See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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one sale to a mortgagee, produced a surplus. More than ninety per-
cent of the sales to mortgagees left deficiencies, compared with defi-
ciencies left in thirty-nine percent of the sales to third parties.
Even though eighty percent of the foreclosure sales left defi-
ciency amounts, many for substantial sums of money,13 ' mortgagees
made virtually no attempt to obtain deficiency judgments. In about
fifteen percent of the cases involving a deficiency, the mortgagor
had declared bankruptcy, and the mortgage debt probably was
discharged.
B. Detailed Findings
1. Details of the Sample
No particular geographic pattern emerged among the 118
properties. The foreclosures were almost evenly distributed be-
tween those located within Syracuse, the largest city in the county,
and those in the suburban and rural areas surrounding the city.' 3 2
Eighty-nine of the foreclosed loans were made by banks and
similar institutional lenders, twenty by individual lenders, and the
remaining nine by other kinds of lenders, such as corporate employ-
ers facilitating employee relocations. In twenty-two percent of the
cases, the original transaction was a purchase money loan made by
the seller of the property. Fifty-nine percent of the loans were made
for the acquisition of the property by lenders other than the sellers.
The remaining nineteen percent of the loans were made subsequent
to the acquisition of the property by the mortgagor.13'
Eighty-nine of the 118 loans were conventional loans without
any government agency involvement after default or foreclosure.
The remaining twenty-nine , loans were insured by government
agencies: twenty-one by the Department of Housing and Urban De-
131 In at least some of these cases, the circumstances indicated that mortgagees
probably could have obtained a substantial deficiency judgment. See infra notes 158-62
and accompanying text.
132 Thirty-seven percent of the county's population and three percent of its land
area are located in Syracuse. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CrrY DATA BOOK
382, 760 (1983).
133 This last category includes construction loans, home-improvement loans, and
loans made for other purposes that were secured by an interest in the real estate. The
following table sets out the distribution of the 118 foreclosures by type of lender and
type of loan:
Bank or Other Other
Institutional Individual Type of
Lender Lender Lender Total
Acquisition Loan by Third Party 65 1 3 69
Acquisition Loan by Seller of Property 3 18 5 26
Nonacquisition Loan 21 1 1 23
TOTAL 89 20 9 118
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velopment, six by the Veterans Administration, and two by the
Small Business Administration. The government agency paid off
each insured mortgagee under the terms of the agreement, then
took over the loan and the property from the mortgagee.13 4
The original loans ranged from $4,200 to $1,800,000, with the
median loan amount being $20,400. Seventy-eight of the properties
were single-family residences, thirteen were two-family residences,
and six were multi-family residences. The remaining twenty-one
properties were devoted to a variety of commercial uses, such as
parking garages, apartment and office buildings, stores, and riding
stables.
2. The Foreclosure Action: Before the Sale
The length of time between the loan and the default that trig-
gered the foreclosure action ranged from as little as three weeks to
as long as twenty-one years, with the median time being a little more
than three years. A preponderance of the defaults occurred during
the first seven years of the loan; very few defaults occurred during
the eighth through thirteenth years, and the balance of defaults
were spread out from the fourteenth year onward 3 5 (see Figure 1).
The time periods between the date of default and the com-
mencement of the foreclosure action were generally rather short.
More than seventy percent of the actions were begun within ten
months of default. In three cases, this period ran as long as two or
three years. In one case more than five years elapsed after the de-
fault before the mortgagee finally instituted foreclosure
proceedings.
The time between the foreclosure action and the entry of the
judgment was generally short. In sixty-four percent of the cases,
this period was six months or less, and in ninety-two percent the
judgment was entered within a year of the initiation of the lawsuit.
A receiver was appointed to manage the property prior to the
sale in seven foreclosures. In five cases only a small amount of in-
terim income was left to apply to the debt after deducting the re-
ceiver's fee.'3 6 In two instances the receiver's operation of the
property produced substantial sums of money ($72,000 and
134 The government agency assumes the mortgagee's position in these cases. Ac-
cordingly, this study treats a later resale by the government agency as if the mortgagee
had made it. The profits and losses realized on resales by these government insurers are
also reported separately. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
135 The borrowers' lack of accumulated equity in the first five to seven years of an
amortizing loan may have caused the large number of defaults during the early years of
the loans. See supra note 61.
136 See N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. § 1371(4) (McKinney 1979) (providing that a court
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Figure 1
Distribution of Defaults
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
and and
under over
Time From Loan To Default (Years)
$106,000), which were used to reduce the outstanding debt
balance. 137
3. At the Foreclosure Sale
a. General. Following entry of the foreclosure judgment, statu-
tory provisions require the mortgagee to advertise and give notice
of the sale.1 38 The court files show that the mortgagees in the sam-
shall direct that "all moneys remaining in the hands of a receiver. . . after payment of
the receiver's fees . . . shall be paid to the plaintiff...").
137 The properties involved were a parking garage and a small shopping center.
Each was in the receiver's care for about two years. The receiver's profit reduced the
debt balances in these two cases by about 8% and 5% respectively.
138 During the study period, the applicable law required the mortgagee to publish
the date and place of the sale as well as a description of the property in a newspaper
published in the county where the property was located. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. § 231
(McKinney 1979) (amended 1984). The statute required the mortgagee to publish this
information at least once in each of the four weeks preceding the sale. Id. § 231(2) (a). If
the property was located outside an incorporated village or a city, the law also required
the mortgagee to post sale notices in three public places in the town where the property
was located. Id. § 231(2)(b). If the sale was to be held in a town or city other than where
the property was located, the law required mortgagees to post notices in the town or city
where the sale was to be held. Id. All notices had to be posted at least 28 days before
the sale. Id.
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ple complied with the statutes. Typically, the mortgagees posted
notice of the sale in several public places (such as the County Court-
house and Town Hall) and advertised the sale in the legal notices of
a local newspaper for four successive weeks before the sale.
Foreclosure sales are generally held at the County Courthouse
in Syracuse. 139 No record is kept of the identity of the bidders or
the amounts bid. The Referee's Report of Sale discloses only the
name of the successful bidder and his bid. The report also includes
the amount the mortgagor owed the lender as of the date of sale,
including accrued interest and any other items.
The amounts owed to the lenders on the sale date varied
widely, ranging from as little as $500 to more than $2.2 million.
Three-quarters of these amounts were $36,000 or less. Additional
amounts due to lenders for costs, advertising, sheriff's and referee's
fees, unpaid real estate taxes, costs of securing the property, and
attorney's fees' 40 generally involved small dollar amounts. The me-
dian additional amount was approximately $1,200, and the highest
was $6,600.141
The sum of the debt balance, accrued interest, and additional
amounts due the mortgagee, added to any surplus amount paid to
the mortgagor or junior lienors, represents the lender's total invest-
ment in the property as of the foreclosure sale date. The calcula-
tions of a surplus or a deficiency amount 142 and of a mortgagee's
profit or loss on resale are based on this total investment amount.
Mortgagees' total investments143 as of the foreclosure sale ranged
from $1,000 to more than $2.2 million, with the median amount
falling at about $23,000.
b. Foreclosure Sale Prices. The winning bids at the foreclosure
139 The notice must state the location of the sale. See supra note 138.
140 N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. § 1371 (McKinney 1979), provides that costs and dis-
bursements of the action, including the Referee's fee are included in the deficiency judg-
ment. The Sheriff's fee, and the costs of advertising and posting the required notices
are covered by this statute. The mortgage agreement usually provides for the mortga-
gor's liability for real estate taxes and for the mortgagee's attorney's fees in connection
with the foreclosure action. See, e.g., I. STEINMAN, I NEW YORx REAL PROPERTY FORMS 3-
27 to 3-28 (2d ed. 1984) (providing for mortgagor's liability for mortgagee's attorney's
fees).
141 These additional amounts were more significant when measured as a percentage
of the debt balance. The median percentage was 7%.
142 This amount is shown on the Referee's Report of Sale as "Surplus or Defi-
ciency." The surplus or deficiency amount is not necessarily the same as the amount
that could be obtained in a deficiency judgment. See supra note 86 (discussion of defi-
ciency judgment); infra notes 158-62 and accompanying text (discussion of deficiency
amounts and judgments).
143 The total investment sometimes exceeded the original amount loaned because of
the addition of accrued but unpaid interest and additional expenses and the small reduc-
tion in principal in the early years of an amortizing loan. See supra note 61.
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sales 144 ranged from a low of $1 to more than $500,000. It is diffi-
cult to evaluate the fairness of these foreclosure sale bids because
when the mortgagee is the sole bidder and does not intend to pur-
sue a deficiency,1 45 he often may enter a nominal bid as a matter of
convenience. Mortgagees' bid amounts may thus be depressed be-
cause of poor attendance at foreclosure sales. Whether this theory
is valid or not, sales to third parties often commanded fairer prices
than those to mortgagees. More than half of the sales to third par-
ties, but only one sale to a mortgagee, generated a surplus. 14 6
c. Identity of Buyers at Foreclosure Sale. In the sample of 118 fore-
closure sales, the mortgagee bid successfully in 91 cases, or seventy-
seven percent of the total, and third parties bought in 27 cases, or
twenty-three percent of the total.' 47 The distribution of types of
properties purchased by mortgagees and third parties corresponded
roughly to the distribution of properties in the sample as a whole.
Third parties acquired slightly more than their proportionate share
of single-family homes, suggesting that some third parties use fore-
closure sales for home-buying rather than for investment purposes.
Third-party purchasers at foreclosure sales typically borrowed
from lenders other than the foreclosing mortgagee. Only one of the
twenty-seven third-party buyers obtained financing from the fore-
closing mortgagee.
The twenty-seven third-party cases involved twenty-six different
buyers. While not conclusive, this fact suggests the absence of
third-party speculators at foreclosure sales.14s There is an indica-
tion to the contrary, however; in eight cases in which third parties
bought at foreclosure and resold for a profit, the foreclosed prop-
erty was a single-family home, and the mortgagors defaulted more
than ten years after acquiring the loan. This fact suggests that these
third-party purchasers may have been on the alert for homeowners
who were forced into foreclosure by some unfortunate circum-
stances after building up considerable equity in their properties. 149
144 In many cases these may have been the only bids, but, as indicated supra text
following note 139, no record is kept of losing bidders at the sale.
145 The mortgagees in the sample rarely pursued deficiencies. See infra notes 158-62
and accompanying text.
146 See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
147 A 95% confidence interval, see supra note 126, predicts that the mortgagee will be
the buyer in 68% to 84% of the mortgage foreclosures from which this sample is drawn.
148 This tentative conclusion is strengthened by our observation that a few names
appeared repeatedly in the Grantor and Grantee indices. Apparently, a small group of
people are active traders of real estate in Onondaga County and indeed may be speculat-
ing in real property. Their activity is not prominent at foreclosure sales, however.
149 Some of these third-party purchasers could have been privy to nonpublic infor-
mation, such as illness or death in a neighboring family, and that family's sudden depar-
ture, as well as knowledge of the value of that neighbor's property.
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d. Deficiencies and Surpluses. Deficiencies or surpluses are calcu-
lated by subtracting the balance of the debt, the accrued interest,
and the additional amount due to the lender on account of the fore-
closure from the successful bid at the foreclosure sale. If the sale
price exceeds these deductions, a surplus remains and is distributed
to junior lienors' 50 or paid to the mortgagor.' 5 ' If the deductions
exceed the price, a deficiency amount results. 152 If the amount bid
at foreclosure equals the amount due the lender, neither a surplus
nor a deficiency results.
The sales left deficiency amounts in 94 of the 118 foreclosures,
or about eighty percent of the total. A deficiency was much more
likely to result when the mortgagee, rather than a third party, was
the buyer at foreclosure. Ninety-two percent of the sales to mortga-
gees left deficiencies, as opposed to thirty-nine percent of the sales
to third parties (see Figure 2). Moreover, the deficiencies in the
third-party cases tended to be relatively small: about half amounted
to less than $5,000, and only one exceeded $18,000.1 53 The defi-
ciency amounts left by mortgagee purchases ranged from less than
$1 to more than $2 million. 154
Only one sale to a mortgagee produced a surplus, and that sur-
plus was only $1,400. In contrast, fifty-four percent of the sales to
third parties generated surpluses to be paid to the mortgagor or
junior lienors. 55 Two-thirds of these surpluses amounted to more
than $5,000.156 Third parties bid the exact amount due to the mort-
gagee in two cases, leaving neither a deficiency nor a surplus; mort-
gagees did the same in six cases. 157
150 N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. § 1354(3) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
151 Id. § 1361 (McKinney 1979).
152 This amount is not necessarily the correct measure of a deficiency judgment, see
supra note 86.
153 The deficiency amount in that case was $375,000. In sales to third parties, the
median deficiency amount was about $4,700.
154 In many of these cases, however, the mortgagee did not lose the amount of the
deficiency because upon a later resale of the property, the mortgagee recovered its en-
tire investment and, in some cases, made a profit. See infra notes 179-80 and accompany-
ing text.
155 A hypothesis test, see supra note 126, shows that at the 5% level of significance,
there is a greater probability of a surplus when a third party is the buyer than when the
mortgagee is the buyer.
156 Sales to third parties generated surpluses of more than $1,000 in 80% of the
cases.
157 When a third party bids the exact amount due at the foreclosure sale, the mort-
gagee is made whole. When the mortgagee bids the exact amount due, the mortgagee
may or may not be made whole, depending on the amount received from later disposi-
tion of the property. If the mortgagee resells the property for less than his total invest-
ment, he will sustain a loss on the transaction, even though no deficiency amount was
left when the property was sold in foreclosure proceedings. The mortgagee sustained a
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Figure 2
Distribution Of Deficiencies,
Surpluses, And Zero Balances
At Foreclosure Sales
~AllI Sales
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Mortgagees A/ Third Parties
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e. Pursuit of Deficiencies-Bankruptcy of Mortgagors. Eighty per-
cent of the foreclosure sales left deficiency amounts. These
amounts are not necessarily the proper measure of a deficiency
judgment; under New York law a deficiency judgment is measured
by deducting the greater of the property's fair market value or the
foreclosure sale price from the amount owed the lender.'
58
Although the fair market value might often exceed the foreclosure
sale price, deficiency judgments, often for substantial amounts, 159
probably could have been obtained in many of those instances
where a disinterested third party bought for less than the amount
due, 160 as well as in many cases where a mortgagee bought and later
loss upon subsequent disposition of the property in two of the six cases in which a mort-
gagee bid the exact amount due.
158 See supra note 86.
159 Leaving aside cases where the mortgagor's bankruptcy explains the nonpursuit
of a deficiency, see infra note 162 and accompanying text, the deficiency amounts were
more than $5,000 in 40% of the remaining cases and more than $50,000 in 8% of the
remaining cases. The highest amount was $2.2 million.
160 A purchase by an unrelated third party is a reliable indication of the regularity of
the foreclosure sale and the fairness of the purchase price, Washburn, supra note 7, at
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resold for a loss.16' Nevertheless, of the ninety-four studied cases in
which the foreclosure sale left a deficiency amount, the mortgagee
obtained a deficiency judgment in only one case, and in that case the
judgment was not satisfied.
The mortgagees may not have pursued deficiency judgments in
fifteen cases because their mortgagors filed for bankruptcy at about
the same time as the foreclosure, suggesting that the deficiency
would have been discharged in bankruptcy. In seventeen other
cases, the mortgagor had filed for bankruptcy either long before the
loan was made or long after the foreclosure. Although these bank-
ruptcies would not discharge the unpaid mortgage debt, they may
be an indication of the anticipated difficulty of collecting the defi-
ciency. Bankruptcy explains the nonpursuit of deficiencies in no
more than a third of the cases, however.' 62
4. After Foreclosure: Resale, Retention, Profit and Loss
a. Retention of Property and Speed of Resale. The study concluded
between four and five years after the 118 foreclosure sales.' 63 Dur-
ing this period the foreclosure sale buyers resold 100 of the proper-
ties, or about eighty-five percent. Fewer third-party buyers than
mortgagee buyers sold within this time frame: almost one-third of
the third-party buyers retained ownership at the close of the study,
as opposed to eleven percent of the mortgagees 164 (see Figure 3).
In two-thirds of the cases in which third parties retained ownership,
the properties involved were single-family homes, again suggesting
that some third parties purchase homes at foreclosure sales as resi-
dences rather than as investments.
888, and thus indicates that the deficiency amount could have been reduced to a defi-
ciency judgment even under the fair market value statute, see supra note 86.
161 Because most resales occurred within a year after the foreclosure sale, see infra
notes 165-66 and accompanying text, the resale price is presumably a reasonable mea-
sure of the fair market value. A resale for less than the amount of the debt would there-
fore suggest that the deficiency amount approximates the deficiency judgment which the
mortgagee could have obtained:
162 In addition to the cases involving bankruptcy, another third of the deficiency
cases may be explained by the fact that the deficiency amount was less than $5,000. The
high cost of collecting the debt may prevent many mortgagees from pursuing such a
small amount. However, because the mortgagee may have calculated the bid amount
purely for convenience and in an amount unrelated to the value of the property, see supra
text accompanying notes 145-46, the deficiency amounts may in some cases understate
the amount that could have been reduced to a deficiency judgment. Moreover, after
factoring out the bankruptcy cases, 40% of the remaining deficiency amounts were more
than $5,000 and 8% were more than $50,000.
163 See supra note 3.
164 One explanation for this difference may be that, with limited exceptions, statutes
prohibit both state-chartered and national banks from owning real property for more
than five years unless they need it for their operations. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 98(3) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1983) (repealed 1984); 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982).
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Figure .3
Resale And Retention
Of Purchased Properties
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Third parties who sold their properties during the period of the
study sold more slowly than did mortgagees x65 (see Figure 3). In
the first six months after foreclosure, forty-seven percent of the
mortgagee resales had taken place, as opposed to twenty-one per-
cent of those of third-party buyers. Within a year, almost eighty
percent of the mortgagees who disposed of their properties had
done so, while only fifty-eight percent of the third parties had done
the same. 166 Regardless of who bought at foreclosure, about ninety-
165 At the 5% level of statistical significance, a hypothesis test, see supra note 126,
establishes that the probability of resale within one year after acquisition at foreclosure
is not the same for mortgagees and third parties.
166 Based on the sample, we can state with individual 95% confidence, see supra note
126, that in 60% to 80% of all cases, a mortgagee buyer will resell property acquired at
foreclosure within one year, while a third party buyer will resell within one year in 15%
to 50% of all cases.
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five percent of the resales that occurred by the close of the study
took place within two years of the foreclosure sale.
b. Profit and Loss on Resale: Mortgagees. Mortgagees purchased
at 90 of the 118 foreclosure sales and resold within the period of the
study in 81 cases. We could not calculate the resale price in nine
resales because the transactions were exempt from the real estate
transfer tax.167 Excluding those nine cases, the mortgagees recov-
ered their investment 168 and made a profit in thirty-five cases, or
about half of the nonexempt resales. The mortgagees sold for less
than their investment, and thus sustained losses, in thirty-seven in-
stances. The profitable sales and the losing sales were scattered
geographically throughout the county, although there were more
profitable sales than losing ones in the suburban areas outside the
city of Syracuse. 169
The profits mortgagees realized on resale generally ranged
from less than $1,000 to $24,000,170 with a median profit of $5,080.
Approximately eleven percent of the profits fell below $1,000; about
twenty-five percent of the profits were between $2,000 and $5,000,
and forty percent were between $5,000 and $10,000 (see Figure 4).
In the one case in which the mortgagee purchased at foreclosure
and generated a surplus (of $1,400), the mortgagee subsequently
resold the property at a $2,750 profit. Twenty-five of the thirty-five
cases in which the mortgagee made a profit on resale involved sin-
gle-family homes. More than half the profits made on single-family
homes exceeded $4,000 and almost one-quarter exceeded
$8,000.171
Mortgagees usually realized their profits within a relatively
short time after foreclosure. More than forty percent of the profits
167 See supra note 118.
168 The mortgagee's investment is the sum of the debt balance due on the date of
foreclosure, including accrued interest, the additional amounts due to the mortgagee, see
supra note 140 and accompanying text, and the amount of any surplus the mortgagee has
paid to the mortgagor or junior lienors. See supra notes 98, 150-51 and accompanying
text.
169 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
170 There was one striking exception to this range: the mortgagee netted about
$648,000 on resale. The documents in the court file suggest that this transaction in-
volved a large construction loan and a default bond. Presumably, after the mortgagor's
default, the mortgagee collected on the bond and completed the project. The extraordi-
narily large "profit," therefore, probably did not reflect the underlying value of the
property at the time of foreclosure but represented a significant additional investment
made by the mortgagee and the bonding company after the mortgagor's default.
171 Where the mortgagee buys a single-family home at a foreclosure sale, we can
predict with 95% confidence that, in 5% to 25% of these cases, the mortgagee will resell
within one year for a profit of at least $4,000. See supra note 126 for an explanation of
confidence intervals.
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resulted from resales that took place within six months of foreclo-
sure, and more than eighty-five percent were realized within one
year of foreclosure. 72 Although in many instances the dollar
amounts of these profits would not be of major significance to a
large lending institution, a surplus of $5,000 or $10,000 might be
very important to a financially distressed homeowner.' 73 When the
return is measured as a percentage of their investment, mortgagees
who held these properties for short time periods frequently realized
annualized rates of return 174 ranging from fifty-six percent to more
Figure 4
Distribution Of Non-exempt Resales:
Profit And Loss For Mortgagees
And Third Parties
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172 Based on the sample, we can state with 95% confidence (see supra note 126 for a
discussion of confidence intervals) that when the mortgagee is the buyer at the foreclo-
sure sale, in 9% to 26% of these cases, the mortgagee will resell the property within one
year of foreclosure and will realize a profit of at least $4,000 on the resale.
173 These amounts might also be important to a junior lienor, who would have
shared in them had they been generated as a surplus at the foreclosure sale. See supra
notes 98, 150 and accompanying text.
174 The annualized rate of return is calculated as follows: the profit is divided by the
mortgagee's investment in the property to produce a rate of return on the transaction.
Thus, a $2,008 profit on an investment of $25,742 would represent an 8% return if the
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than one thousand percent. 175
Mortgagees resold the properties for less than their total invest-
ment and sustained losses in about half of the nonexempt resales.
These losses ranged from a few hundred dollars to $1.4 million.' 76
Almost two-thirds of the losses fell between $2,000 and $15,000,
with a median loss of $6,900. As with the profits, the losses were
realized soon after foreclosure. Fifty percent of the losses were
within the first six months, seventy-three percent within one year,
and more than ninety percent within two years. Although the likeli-
hood of profit or loss on resale did not hinge on the type of prop-
erty involved, single-family home sales generated slightly more
profits than losses, and commercial property sales showed the great-
est extremes of both profit and loss.
Mortgagees made profits in about half the resales and incurred
losses in the other half, but their total losses on resale outweighed
their gains. The median loss on resale was about $1,800 greater
than the median profit, and the largest losses substantially exceeded
the largest profits. If all the profits and losses were netted, mortga-
gees would show an average loss on these resales of slightly more
than $13,000.
If we consider all foreclosure transactions, rather than only
those involving nonexempt resales, the mortgagees in the sample
sustained even greater losses. Three reasons explain these losses.
First, the exempt resales,177 in which the purchase price could not
be determined, were more likely to produce losses than profits.
These sales were usually tax-exempt because local government units
or charities purchased the properties, and neither were likely to pay
investment was held for exactly one year. If, however, the same $2,008 profit is earned
but the investment is held for less than a year, the rate of return must be increased to
reflect that shorter holding period. For example, when the investment is held for 38
days, the 8% return calculated earlier must be adjusted by a factor of 9.6, calculated by
dividing the number of days in a year (365) by the number of days the investment is held
(38 days, in this example), yielding an annualized rate of return of 77%.
175 The following table shows selected rates of return for a few of the resales by
mortgagees:
Investment Time Between Profit/
in Foreclosure Sale Investment Annualized
Profit Property and Resale (days) in Property Rate of Return
$8,524 $46,226 118 .18 56%
$3,288 $23,462 83 .14 61%
$2,008 $25,742 38 .08 77%
$6,526 $22,224 126 .29 847%
$2,750 $4,000 117 .69 215%
$1,797 $ 3,953 41 .45 400%
$23,798 $ 8,952 91 2.66 1,067%
176 The $1,400,000 loss involved a commercial property and was the only one of this
magnitude. The next largest loss was $87,000.
177 See supra note 118.
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much for foreclosed properties. Second, because no mortgagee col-
lected a deficiency judgment,17 8 the deficiency amounts remaining
in eleven of the cases involving third-party buyers also represented
losses to the mortgagees involved. When these deficiency amounts
are combined with the profits and losses on resale, the average
mortgagee sustained an overall loss of almost $14,000. Finally, the
nine properties which mortgagees purchased at foreclosure and
were still holding four to five years later may also produce losses, if
the mortgagee must eventually resell them for nominal amounts.
On the whole, mortgagees in the study lost more money than
they gained on foreclosures, but the foreclosure sale made the mort-
gagor whole in forty-four percent of all cases in the sample.' 79
Based on the sample, we can expect that mortgagees will be made
whole in thirty-five to fifty-three percent of all foreclosures.180
c. Profit and Loss on Resale: Third Parties. Approximately two-
thirds of the third parties who purchased at foreclosure resold
within the period of the study; they sold profitably in fourteen of the
fifteen resales in which the resale price could be determined.' 8 ' The
profits from twelve of those fourteen resales were between $7,000
and $23,000.182 The only loss amounted to $2,750 (see Figure 4).
Thus, third parties were much more likely than mortgagees to make
a profit on resale.'88 This suggests that the third-party buyers were
snapping up the most attractive properties at foreclosure,18 4 leaving
the depreciated and neglected parcels for the mortgagees to buy in
order to protect their investments. 8 5
d. Insured Mortgages: Resale, Retention, Profit, and Loss. In
twenty-nine cases a government agency took over the foreclosed
property from the mortgagee and paid off the mortgagee under the
insurance contract.' 86 Twenty-one of these cases involved single-
178 See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text.
179 See supra note 128. At the 5% level of statistical significance, a hypothesis test
indicates that the probability that the mortgagee would be made whole was the same
whether the mortgagee or a third party was the buyer at the foreclosure sale.
180 We can make this statement with 95% confidence; see supra note 126.
181 Four resales by third parties occurred in transactions exempt from the imposi-
tion of the real estate transfer tax, and because we calculated the resale prices from this
tax, none of these resale prices could be determined. See supra note 118.
182 The two other resales, each of a single-family home, generated profits of $42,000
and $54,000, respectively.
183 In comparison, mortgagees resold at a profit in about half of the cases. See supra
text accompanying notes 168-71. This discrepancy is made more striking because even
when third parties paid enough at the foreclosure sale to generate a surplus, the third
parties resold at a profit in two-thirds of these cases (10 out of 15).
184 An alternative explanation is that third parties were more likely than mortgagees
to invest substantial sums in improving properties acquired at foreclosure.
185 See De Funiak, supra note 23, at 411; Prather, supra note 6, at 455.
186 See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
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family homes, seven were two-family homes, and one was a commer-
cial property.
After assuming the mortgagee's position, the insuring agency
resold the properties in twenty-five cases. Of the eighteen cases
with known prices,' 87 eight resales generated profits, 88 and ten re-
sulted in losses. a89 The profits ranged from about $1,800 to about
$8,000; the losses ranged from $2,200 to about $18,000. More than
three-quarters of the resales by government agencies .occurred
within one year of foreclosure.
IV
ANALYSIS, IMPLICATIONS, AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The results of the empirical study suggest that foreclosure by
sale is not achieving its objectives of providing competitive bidding
and fair prices, 190 while preserving mortgagees' rights to collect de-
ficiencies.' 9 ' Instead, it often functions as a meaningless ceremony
whereby the mortgagee exchanges the property for the debt, then
retains any surplus generated through a profitable resale, takes any
loss on an unprofitable disposal of the property, or if the property is
not resold, absorbs the deficiency owed by the mortgagor. None of
these results is desirable. On the one hand, the mortgagee who
keeps the surplus deprives the mortgagor of a benefit that belongs
to him and that our system clearly intends him to have.' 92 On the
other hand, the failure of the mortgagee to collect deficiencies, or
his absorption of losses on unprofitable resales, may increase the
cost of credit.
Because the present system of foreclosure by sale causes these
unintended results, a number of reforms should be considered.
First, the present foreclosure by sale process should be modified so
that when a mortgagee buys a property at its own foreclosure sale,
holds it for a short period of time, and then resells it for a profit, the
mortgagor will receive the profit. Either judicial process or statute
can achieve this result. Second, the foreclosure by sale process
should be reformed to bring it closer to achieving its underlying
goals of attracting interested bidders and producing fair prices, to
reduce deficiencies and perhaps yield surpluses. If these goals can-
187 Seven resales were exempt from the real estate transfer tax. Thus, we could not
determine their resale prices. See supra note 118.
188 The Department of Housing and Urban Development had six profitable resales,
the Veterans Administration had one, and the Small Business Administration had one.
189 Nine losses were on properties insured by the Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development and one loss was on a Veterans Administration property.
190 See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 58.
192 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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not be achieved, then perhaps we should abandon the public-sale
process as a costly waste of time and money. Finally, the reasons
mortgagees fail to pursue deficiencies should be investigated. If it is
possible to do so without compromising other societal goals, mort-
gagees should be aided in reducing foreclosure losses.
A. Foreclosure by Sale as Strict Foreclosure
In many cases the mortgagee is the buyer at the foreclosure
sale, and the statutory process operates as the functional equivalent
of strict foreclosure. 193 The purchasing mortgagee exchanges the
property for the debt and is free to dispose of it. The mortgagee
typically resells the property fairly quickly and, in about one-half of
the cases studied, profitably. 194 Although these profits are probably
not important to a large financial institution, 195 they are clearly sig-
nificant to a beleaguered homeowner. The profit, which the mort-
gagee retains, may fairly be characterized as the mortgagor's
accumulated equity in the property. Even if the mortgagee resells at
a loss, the statutory foreclosure sale process resembles strict fore-
closure. In these cases, the mortgagee absorbs the loss and does
not collect the appropriate deficiency amount from the mortgagor.
Thus, whether the mortgagee resells at a profit or at a loss, the cur-
rent process produces the precise results that foreclosure by sale
was intended to prevent. 196
Mortgagees are supposed to be able to obtain and collect judg-
ments for deficiencies in appropriate cases.' 97 If mortgagees cannot
193 Some cases in which a third party buys at foreclosure may arguably be analogous
to strict foreclosure; if the third party quickly resells the property at a profit, he unjustly
reaps the surplus that should have gone to the mortgagor. If a third party buys, and
there is an uncollected deficiency, then the mortgagee receives less than it was entitled
to. However, when third parties buy at foreclosure sales, there are more surpluses,
fewer deficiencies, see supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text, and fewer fast resales
of the foreclosed property than when mortgagees purchase at foreclosure; see supra
notes 164-66 and accompanying text, suggesting that such sales are far less abusive than
those to mortgagees. See also infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
194 About half of the mortgagees in the study who bought at foreclosure resold
quickly at a profit. See supra text accompanying notes 168-72. Some of these profits may
be attributable to additional investment in the property by the mortgagee. It appears
unlikely, however, that many institutional lenders would regularly increase their invest-
ment in foreclosed properties by doing extensive renovations or major repair or recon-
struction work because their business is loaning money, not investing in real estate.
195 The rates of return, however, can be startlingly high. See supra notes 174-75 and
accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
197 See POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 26, 462, at 696.50 ("Traditionally, in the
United States foreclosure has connoted a deficiency judgment, that is, a judgment col-
lectible out of the personal assets of the mortgagor for that part of the basic obligation
not realized on the sale of the mortgaged land interest.") (footnote omitted); see also
supra note 58.
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collect these deficiencies, at least they have an opportunity to pro-
tect themselves against these losses by adjusting the cost and availa-
bility of credit. However, when mortgagee-buyers resell at a profit,
homeowners are powerless to prevent the unjust appropriation of
the equity in their properties. 198 The forfeiture inherent in this situ-
ation prompted the creation of the equity of redemption 300 years
ago'9 9 and the substitution of foreclosure by sale for strict foreclo-
sure 180 years ago.200 The original goals of foreclosure by sale are
as pertinent today as they were then. If experience shows that the
public sale process does not achieve those goals, then that process
should be changed.
Lenders probably will resist any change in the statutory pro-
cess, arguing that overall, losses on foreclosures exceed gains20'
and that, thus, they should be permitted to retain the occasional
gain to offset greater losses. This argument is not convincing. First,
while mortgagees may as a class sustain net losses on foreclosures,
many mortgagees achieve net profits. More importantly, each mort-
gage transaction is independent of all others; a lender should not be
allowed to make up a loss on one transaction by unfairly retaining a
profit on a separate and unrelated transaction.
Lenders might also argue that the interest rates they charge in-
corporate not only the anticipated losses, but the prospect of occa-
sional profits, 20 2 and that the cost of credit would rise if they were
not allowed to retain those profits. The numbers and amounts of
these profits probably are not large enough to significantly affect the
lending practices of major institutions. Nevertheless, it is inappro-
priate to reduce interest rates generally, at the expense of a rela-
tively small number of financially distressed homeowners. In this
connection it is worth reemphasizing that the drafters of our fore-
closure by sale statutes never intended lenders to receive these
profits. 203
Under the existing foreclosure by sale process mortgagees re-
198 Similarly, junior mortgagees who must pay cash and invest additional sums in the
property to protect their investment, see supra note 101, often have no practical way to
protect their interest in any potential surplus.
199 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
201 See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text. Mortgagees may also argue that
the gains reported in this Article are illusory, perhaps because of additional investments
made after foreclosure, see supra note 194 and infra note 254, or because additional un-
secured loans had been made to the defaulting mortgagors. This Article evaluates and
draws conclusions only from the available empirical data.
202 This position would be inconsistent with that taken by bankers contacted in con-
nection with this study, who uniformly maintained that foreclosing mortgagees never
made profits on foreclosures. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
203 Mortgagees' retention of these profits, which represent the increased value of the
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tain profits from resale that they should return to mortgagors.
There is no reason to distinguish between profits realized on a re-
sale and a surplus produced at a foreclosure sale. In either case, the
profit should be returned to the mortgagor. However, this general
principle should be subject to a number of qualifications:
(a) Only mortgagees who purchase at foreclosure, and
not third parties, should be required to account to the
mortgagor for a profitable resale. First, mortgagees enjoy
an advantage20 4 at the foreclosure sale because they con-
trol the sale and can bid up to the amount of the debt with-
out expending any cash; 20 5 third parties must pay for
properties they buy with out-of-pocket dollars. Second,
mortgagees have a preexisting relationship with their mort-
gagors, which they should not be permitted to exploit;
third parties who buy at foreclosure do so in an arms-
length transaction vis-a-vis the mortgagor. The study
shows a much greater likelihood of a fair price and a sur-
plus, and a far lesser likelihood of a deficiency or a quick
resale when a third party, rather than the mortgagee, is the
buyer at foreclosure. 20 6 Finally, in order to preserve the
advantageous results associated with foreclosure sales to
land, was one of the principal evils of strict foreclosure that foreclosure by sale was
intended to prevent. See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
Lenders may make two other arguments against a reform directed at forcing them
to relinquish profits realized on resales after foreclosure. First, they may argue that they
deserve compensation because their investment in the property continues until the re-
sale, depriving them of the opportunity to invest their funds elsewhere. This argument
fails, however, because the purchase of the property at foreclosure is a further invest-
ment, which may produce an extremely high rate of return. See supra notes 174-75 and
accompanying text. A lender who is receiving a return of more than 50% is hardly in a
position to complain that he was prevented from investing the same funds at 14%.
A second argument against reform that lenders might proffer is that part of the
profit realized on resale is attributable to the inflation in the value of the property during
their holding period and, therefore, does not belong to the mortgagor. Since real estate
is not ordinarily subject to extremely rapid shifts in value, it seems unlikely that mortga-
gees who hold these properties for short time periods, see supra notes 165-66 and accom-
panying text, are entitled to a significant share of the profits on this basis. Nevertheless,
reformers might further consider the idea of apportioning that percentage of resale
profits attributable to inflation between foreclosure and resale.
204 See United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 368 (9th Cir. 1970)
(Ely, J., dissenting) ("Unfortunately, this expectation was frustrated by reason of the
immense advantages favoring the mortgagee at the sale. First, it was unnecessary for the
mortgagee to raise and expend any cash up to the amount of the unpaid debt. Second,
there would not often be an interested outside buyer, or junior lien holder with cash, at
the precise time of the sale. Thus, the senior mortgagee was assured of being almost
always the only bidder at the sale."); Nelson, supra note 6, at 151, 169; Washburn, supra
note 7, at 849.
205 See Nelson, supra note 6, at 151.
206 In many cases where a third party made a profit on resale, in fact, a surplus had
been generated at the foreclosure sale. See supra note 183.
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third parties they should be allowed to retain the profits
from resale. Forcing third parties to relinquish resale prof-
its would dampen their interest in purchasing at foreclo-
sure sales; instead, their participation should be
encouraged in order to produce fair prices and surpluses.
(b) Mortgagees should only be required to return
profits from resale of owner-occupied residential proper-
ties, and not from the resale of commercial or rental
properties. 20 7 Many profitable resales involved single-fam-
ily homes. These homeowners were probably the least
knowledgeable about their rights, the most financially
harmed by foreclosure, and the most in need of protec-
tion. 20 8 Commercial borrowers should have the knowledge
and resources to protect themselves, even during
foreclosure.209
(c) Mortgagees should only be required to return
profits on those resales made within one year after foreclo-
sure. The longer the mortgagee holds the property after
foreclosure, the more likely he is to invest additional
money in it or incur additional costs due to holding it.
When a profitable resale occurs within a year after the fore-
closure sale, the profit made on the resale is less likely to be
attributable to action on the mortgagee's part than to the
accumulated equity of the homeowner. Using the limit of
one year for this rule would greatly curtail the unjust re-
sults presently found because the study indicates that more
than eighty-five percent of the mortgagees' resale profits
were made within a year after foreclosure. 210
(d) Mortgagees should be required to return only the
actual profits on the resale and should be entitled to keep
the portion of the proceeds required to cover legitimate ex-
penses associated with holding or reselling the property211
or to compensate them for any amounts invested in the
207 See Lifton, supra note 58, at 1942 (emphasizing "unsophisticated position and
• . . weaker bargaining power" of owner-occupied residential property owners as distin-
guished from commercial or rental property owners).
208 Id. at 1942; Madway & Pearlman, A Mortgage Foreclosure Primer: Part III: Proposals
for Change, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 473, 475 (1974) ("in a significant number of cases,
especially involving low-income homeowners, either through inadvertence or lack of
knowledge," homeowners will allow mortgagees to take strict foreclosure of their
homes).
209 People who run small businesses may suffer from the same lack of knowledge
and power as homeowners and may need protection in their dealings with mortgagees.
2 10 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
211 These expenses might include real estate taxes, attorney's fees, and brokerage
commissions incurred after the foreclosure action concludes.
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property between foreclosure and resale. 2 12
One method of implementing this policy of returning the mort-
gagee's profits on resale to the mortgagor would be to handle
profitable resales on a case-by-case basis. The traditional equity ju-
risdiction of courts handling foreclosure actions gives them broad
discretion in fashioning appropriate remedies. 21 3 For example, as
in Spears,214 the court might simply order the mortgagee to return
the profit made on resale to the mortgagor. This result is supported
by a number of existing legal theories, such as unjust enrichment or
the constructive trust remedy.21 5
A judicial solution to this problem is feasible but has some
drawbacks. Many mortgagors will neither know about the new right,
nor be aware of its applicability to their own situation. 216 Moreover,
until a well-developed body of case law exists, each court would ap-
ply its own standard in such cases. 217 Although such flexibility
might be beneficial, 218 both mortgagors and mortgagees would suf-
fer from inconsistent decisions during the developmental stages of
the law.
An alternative to the judicial approach is a statutory solution. A
statute could require mortgagees who buy at foreclosure and subse-
quently resell the property within a year to submit a detailed report
of the transaction to the mortgagor and to the court granting the
foreclosure. The report would include details of the resale,219 addi-
212 The effects of inflation might be taken into account if they proved significant. See
supra note 203.
213 See Washburn, supra note 7, at 855-56; OSBORNE, supra note 20, §§ 317-18.
214 Central Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Spears, 425 So. 2d 403 (Miss. 1983) (holding that
mortgagee's winning bid at foreclosure sale was inadequate when mortgagee resold
foreclosed property within 12 days at a price two and one-half times bid; mortgagee
compelled to return surplus to mortgagor). See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying
text for a more complete discussion of the case.
215 See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAw OF REsTrrTION §§ 124, 125, 160 (1937); BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1353, 1377 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
216 Mortgagors would have to monitor the resales of their foreclosed properties to
discover whether the resale triggered the right to bring such an action. Monitoring
might require repetitive examinations of public records which few people are trained to
understand.
217 Return of the mortgagee's profit on resale might be appropriate in a case where
it would be "impossible to state [the price paid at the foreclosure sale] to a man of
common sense without producing an exclamation at the inequality of it." Federal Credit
Co. v. Boleware, 163 Miss. 830, 835, 142 So. 1, 2 (1932) (when holder of conventional
sales contract suing for balance due after resale of truck had become purchaser at fore-
closure sale, evidence of fraud in sale insufficient to raise jury question).
218 Judicial flexibility would prevent mortgagees from attempting to circumvent the
law. For examples of some of these potential attempts, see infra notes 220-22 and ac-
companying text.
219 These facts include the resale price, date of resale, identity of the buyer, and
index numbers to the Deed and Mortgage Books recording the documents substantiat-
ing the resale transaction.
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tional costs incurred or investments made since foreclosure, and any
profit made. The profit, less these adjustments, would be required
to be returned to the mortgagor. The law could enforce the re-
quirement that the mortgagee report and account for any profits by
imposing financial or licensing penalties on noncomplying lend-
ers. 220 Mortgagees might attempt to circumvent this rule by simply
structuring their transactions to fall slightly outside the one year pe-
riod. Most profitable resales, however, would probably fall within
one year 221 and few mortgagees would risk losing money on a later
resale merely to gain a relatively small profit.222
This statutory reporting requirement would place new burdens
on mortgagees, but because a reselling mortgagee would have all
the facts necessary to complete the report, the obligation would not
be excessively costly or time-consuming. Requiring mortgagees to
fill out a standardized reporting form would be a small price to pay
to reduce the injustice of mortgagees retaining profits that belong
to mortgagors.
B. Improving the Foreclosure Sale
The study found that sales to third parties more successfully
achieve the goals underlying foreclosure by sale than do sales to
mortgagees. Third-party purchases result in fewer deficiencies and
offer a greater prospect of a surplus than purchases by mortga-
gees. 2 23 Although the study indicates that third-party participation
correlates with a more successful sale, we should interpret this find-
ing with care. We cannot conclude that third-party participation
necessarily caused the higher prices paid at those sales. Some evi-
dence suggests that third parties tend to buy at foreclosure only
when the property is particularly attractive224 and that mortgagees
(who must buy, if no one else does, to protect their investments) 225
are left with properties that have depreciated because of market
forces, neglect, or abuse. Further study is needed to determine
what role the attractiveness of the property itself, as opposed to
knowledge about the availability of the property, plays in determin-
220 Other methods of enforcement might include requiring a provision in every
mortgage giving the mortgagor the right to profits from the resale or granting the mort-
gagor a statutory lien on the mortgaged property to secure the right to a resale profit.
221 In the sample, 80% of the resales by mortgagees occurred within a year, see supra
note 166 and accompanying text.
222 Mortgagees also might seek to avoid the consequence of such a new statute by
utilizing dummy corporations as third parties to buy on their behalf at foreclosure sales.
If such conduct seemed likely to thwart the intent of the proposal, the law could em-
power courts to grant extraordinary relief to mortgagors to prevent injustice.
223 See supra notes 153-57 and accompanying text.
224 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
225 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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ing third-party participation in foreclosure sales.226
If studies indicate that m6re active participation by third-party
buyers would produce more successful foreclosure sales, then the
procedures of those sales should be improved to encourage more
third parties to attend and enter into spirited, competitive bidding.
Third parties may not be actively participating in foreclosure sales
for several reasons. In contrast to the mortgagee, who can bid up to
the amount of the debt without making any new investment of
cash,227 a third-party bidder must pay the full amount of his bid in
cash shortly after the sale.228 This requirement may hinder third
parties in obtaining financing229 and thus may exclude those third
parties who lack sufficient cash to purchase without borrowing.
Third-party buyers also must forgo the usual amenities associated
with a real estate purchase. For example, they do not deal with the
seller face to face, 230 nor can they shop around or reflect upon the
transaction. Some buyers who might otherwise be interested may
shy away from the swift and sudden23 l nature of the foreclosure
sale.
Lack of notice about foreclosure sales may effectively exclude
some third parties from bidding. The notices required by the typi-
cal foreclosure statute do not attract the attention of the general
public; 23 2 people in the market for a home are unlikely to consult
the small-print legal advertisements located in the back pages of the
newspaper. 233 Moreover, if third parties cannot inspect foreclosed
properties before the sale, they will not obtain sufficient information
226 Such an inquiry, which is beyond the scope of this Article, might include an on-
site inspection of foreclosed properties at the time of the foreclosure sale. An on-site
inspection would aid in determining whether third parties were purchasing only the best
properties, leaving the depreciated properties for mortgagees to buy.
227 See, e.g., United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 368 (9th Cir.
1970) (Ely, J., dissenting); COOPER-HILL & GREENBERG, supra note 30, at 234; Durfee &
Doddridge, supra note 6, at 840; Nelson, supra note 6, at 151; Washburn, supra note 7, at
849.
228 10 G. THOMPSON, supra note 25, § 5168, at 162; Washburn, supra note 7, at 849.
229 An ordinary home loan might require as long as two months for approval. One
commentator has observed that "[m]ost real estate buyers are not accustomed to all-
cash purchases." Lifton, supra note 58, at 1936-37.
230 The buyer often wants the opportunity to ask questions about the property. See
Lifton, supra note 58, at 1937 (maintaining that most purchasers of real estate need face-
to-face negotiation in order to achieve deals which take into account their economic and
tax needs).
231 See id. (arguing that nature of "forced" public foreclosure sales makes it difficult
to find buyers other than mortgagees).
232 See Washburn, supra note 7, at 896 (identifying ineffectiveness of notice in at-
tracting potential buyers as major cause of price inadequacy in foreclosure sales).
233 See Nelson, supra note 6, at 151; Tefft, supra note 24, at 590. Both commentators
suggest that the general public is even more unlikely to be aware of such notices when
the notices appear in legal newspapers.
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to make an informed judgment about property value.234
A few basic requirements could ameliorate many of these de-
fects in the public sale process. Improving the advertisement and
notice requirements to alert more people to foreclosure sales would
be a fairly simple matter. Mortgagees could advertise foreclosures
in the same manner as ordinary real estate; specifically, the adver-
tisement could use simple language to describe the property, 235
rather than couching the description in arcane legal language, 236
234 See Nelson, supra note 6, at 152 (arguing that mortgagors about to lose their
property are reluctant to cooperate in allowing inspection of property even though in-
spections may generate greater third-party interest and, hence, more spirited bidding
and higher prices).
235 See id. at 163 (suggesting use of "normal commercial descriptive and pictorial
advertising").
236 A typical newspaper advertisement, giving notice of the impending foreclosure
sale of a single-family home, is instructive. The classified section of a Syracuse newspa-
per published the following advertisement in connection with the "Wilson" foreclosure.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text. In the newspaper, the advertisement is closely
set, in six-point type, in a single column one and three-eighths inches wide and six in-
ches long.
NOTICE OF SALE
STATE OF NEW YORK, SUPREME COURT, COUNTY OF ONON-
DAGA, "OLD LINE SAVINGS BANK," Plaintiff, vs. "THOMAS D. WIL-
SON," et al., Defendants, Index No. 79-289, Pursuant to a judgment of
foreclosure and sale granted on July 13, 1979, and entered in the above-
entitled action in the Onondaga County Clerk's Office on the 18th day of
July, 1979, I, the undersigned Referee in said judgment named, will sell
at public auction at the first floor lobby on the west side of the Court
House in the City of Syracuse, New York, on August 23, 1979, at 10:15
o'clock in the forenoon of that day the following described premises:
"ALL THAT TRACT OR PARCEL OF LAND, situate in the Town of
Marcellus, County of Onondaga and State of New York, being part of
Farm Lot No. 14 in said Town and more particularly described as Lot No.
4555 of Limeledge Estate Section B, according to a map thereof made by
Ronald F. Linderman, L.S., dated September 10, 1973, and filed in the
Onondaga County Clerk's Office December 3, 1973 as Map No. 5291.
The above premises are also more particularly described as follows: ALL
THAT TRACT OR PARCEL OF LAND, with the buildings and improve-
ments thereon erected, situate in the Town of Marcellus, County of On-
ondaga and State of New York, being part of Farm Lot No. 14 in said
Town, described as follows: BEGINNING at a point in the centerline of
Limeledge Road which pofnt [sic] is 519.93 feet from the southeast cor-
ner of Limeledge Estate Tract, Section B, which southeast corner is
1789.5 feet from the centerline of the Old Seneca Turnpike; thence N. 82
degrees 38' 25" W. 351.02 feet to a point; thence N. 6 degrees 08' 41" E.
160.0 feet to a point; thence N. 82 degrees 38' 25" E. 354.47 feet to a
point in the centerline of Limeledge Road, thence S. 7 degrees 22' 50"
W. 159.96 feet along the centerline of Limeledge Road to the point and
place of beginning. Subject to the rights of the public in and to
Limeledge Road as it now exists as shown on the above-described tract
map. Further, subject to easements, covenants and restrictions of
record."
DATED: July 18, 1979
MICHAEL BYRNE, ESQ.
REFEREE
Street Address of Property to be foreclosed: 4555 Limeledge Road,
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and could appear with other real estate advertising, rather than in
the back of the classified section. Increasing the amount of time be-
tween the first notice and the sale date and between the sale and the
time when the bidder must pay for the property would afford third
parties more time to seek financing both before and after the sale.
In addition, this would allow third parties time to inspect the prop-
erty; mandating that the property be available for this purpose is
another logical requirement.
Other possibilities exist for improving the sale, perhaps more
onerous to mortgagees, but possibly more conducive to generating
higher prices. The foreclosure sale could be changed to more
closely resemble an ordinary retail real estate sale,23 7 rather than a
forced auction sale. Because such an approach might be inappropri-
ate for some properties, a statute could allow the court to require
mortgagees to obtain an independent appraisal before authorizing a
public sale. If the appraisal significantly exceeded the amount
owed, the court would establish the appraised amount as an upset
price. 238 If neither the mortgagee nor a third party bid the ap-
praised amount at foreclosure, the court would then order the mort-
gagee to place the property on the retail market for a reasonable
time, 23 9 using ordinary business practices to sell the property. Typi-
cally, this would involve employing a real estate broker. Changing
the foreclosure sale from a forced, all-cash sale at the courthouse to
an ordinary retail sale, including a broker, probably would attract
Marcellus, New York.
P16706
Syracuse Post-Standard, Aug. 14, i979. Recasting this advertisement to resemble more
closely those used in ordinary sales of real estate could encourage substantially greater
public interest. For example, it might read as follows:
FORECLOSURE SALE
MARCELLUS - Lovely three bedroom ranch home; new kitchen, fire-
place, hardwood floors. Best offer over $52,000 takes it. Call Old Line
Savings Bank at 423-9999 to arrange an appointment to see this property
located at 4555 Limeledge Road, Marcellus.
237 See Nelson, supra note 6, at 163-65 (advocating appointment of "truly independ-
ent" trustee who would have 90-day period after rendering of foreclosure judgment in
which to sell property by customary "commercial means," including use of brokers and
advertising); Washburn, supra note 7, at 937, 941 (endorsing the Uniform Land Transac-
tions Act's foreclosure provisions).
238 Although this technique is seldom used, it is "part of the inherent judicial power
to control the foreclosure process." Washburn, supra note 7, at 883; see also Vaughan,
supra note 25, at 964. Some state statutes currently require the use of an appraisal to
establish an upset price. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-25, -28 (West Supp.
1984); LA. CODE CIV. PROc. ANN. arts. 2723, 2771 (West 1961). For a discussion of
these and other statutes, see Madsen, supra note 12, at 349-50; Washburn, supra note 7,
at 903-04.
239 Perhaps a period of no longer than three to six months would be appropriate for
this purpose.
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more bidders, 240 which, in turn, would significantly increase the sale
price. If mortgagees implemented these practices, they would be
entitled to the cost of the appraisal, the interim interest expense,
and the brokerage commission. 24 1
Further study and experimentation may show whether signifi-
cant modifications of the foreclosure sale process will heighten pub-
lic interest and increase prices. This study demonstrates that, in
many cases, the foreclosed property's value exceeds the foreclosure
sale price. 242 If merely improving the sale can extract that value
from the property, significant benefits would redound to both mort-
gagors and junior lienors. Mortgagees who now suffer losses be-
cause of uncollected, and perhaps uncollectible, deficiencies would
also enjoy an improved position.
C. Proposing Strict Foreclosure-With Protection for the
Mortgagor
If studies show that attempts to significantly improve the fore-
closure sale probably will not result in higher prices, a public sale
will continue to be a waste of time and money in many foreclo-
sures. 243 A better resolution to the problem might allow the mort-
gagee to enjoy the efficiency and economy associated with strict
foreclosure, but only if the mortgagor is protected.244 The mortga-
gee could propose strict foreclosure 245 in any case in which, in his
judgment, a sale would not be useful. To protect the interests of
mortgagors in these cases, a statute could empower the court to re-
240 For some reasons why the retail process may encourage more bidders, see supra
notes 228-31 and accompanying text.
241 Other commentators have suggested that a public official should supervise the
entire foreclosure process. This "foreclosure commissioner" would conduct the sale in
such a way as to generate the highest price and to protect the interests of both mortga-
gor and mortgagee. Madway & Pearlman, supra note 208, at 478-79. See also Lifton,
supra note 58, at 1942-45 (arguing for rapid appointment of mortgagee or its designee as
receiver); Washburn, supra note 7, at 935 (noting that proposed Federal Mortgage Fore-
closure Act requires mortgagee to designate "foreclosure commissioner" to oversee
foreclosure).
242 Supra notes 167-85 and accompanying text.
243 Fairchild, supra note 8, at 5. The wasted money is represented by the additional
amount due to the mortgagee above the debt and accrued interest. In the sample, the
median such amount was approximately $1,200, representing a median increment to the
debt and accrued interest of 7%, supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. These
figures may slightly overstate the actual amounts because in some instances they include
unpaid real estate taxes for periods before the foreclosure sale. Nevertheless, in many
cases where the foreclosure sale merely transfers the property to the mortgagee in ex-
change for the debt, a significant portion of the additional amount due represents
wasted cash expenditures.
244 This procedure could build on the existing protections associated with strict
foreclosure in jurisdictions permitting its use. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying
text.
245 See UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS Acr § 3-507 (1974) (amended 1978).
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quire an independent appraisal of the current retail market value of
the property. If the appraisal showed the property to be worth less
than the amount of the debt, the mortgagee could foreclose without
a sale. In return for avoiding the time and trouble of a pointless
public sale, mortgagees would relinquish the right to seek deficien-
cies.246 If the appraised value exceeded the debt, the mortgagee
could then choose whether to sell the property in a standard retail
sale, as described above,247 or to take title to the property upon pay-
ing the mortgagor the difference between the amount of the debt
and the appraisal.248 If the mortgagee chose neither option or did
not propose strict forclosure at all, the mortgagee would retain the
traditional right to seek a deficiency, with the protections described
above 249 serving to return to mortgagors the profits made on quick
resales by mortgagees.
This proposal would benefit mortgagees by avoiding many
foreclosure sales that are pointless, wasteful, and inefficient. At the
same time, it would fully protect mortgagors from being deprived of
their accumulated equity. 250
D. Uncollected Deficiencies-Help for Mortgagees
The study indicates that mortgagees rarely seek deficiencies,
even though many foreclosures involve significant uncollected
amounts, some of which could have been reduced to deficiency
judgments.251 If the bankruptcy of the mortgagor is the problem,
then the mortgagee must bear any losses along with the other credi-
tors. In cases where the mortgagor is not bankrupt, studies should
inquire into the reasons mortgagees make no attempt to collect the
deficiencies owed them. One possibility is that a mortgagor who
loses his real estate in foreclosure is already in extremis and will not
246 The study indicates that mortgagees rarely seek deficiencies, see supra notes 158-
62 and accompanying text; therefore, this waiver presumably would not work great
hardship on them.
247 Supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
248 Although this suggestion may seem far-fetched to many bankers, its antecedents
are found in medieval English mortgages, which "frequently provided that if the mort-
gagee acquired the land by forfeiture, he would pay an additional sum to the mortgagor,
a sum which was apparently intended to reflect the difference between the debt and the
value of the land." McGovern, supra note 10, at 148.
249 See supra notes 204-22 and accompanying text.
250 Unlike § 3-507 of the 1974 Official Text of the UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS
ACT, which has been criticized because it would severely harm many mortgagors, see
Madway & Pearlman, supra note 208, at 475, this plan to allow the mortgagee to propose
strict foreclosure would fully protect the rights of mortgagors. Section 3-507 of the
1974 version has not been carried forward into the 1978 Official Text of the UNIFORM
LAND TRANSACTIONS AcT (1978).
251 See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
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have any nonexempt assets worth pursuing.25 2 Although this expla-
nation may be compelling as to defaulting homeowners, it may not
apply to other types of borrowers, such as business borrowers, who
may have additional unencumbered assets.
Mortgagees also may not bother seeking deficiencies because
the antideficiency legislation passed in the 1930s makes such judg-
ments too difficult to obtain.253 If further study indicates that the
Depression-era antideficiency legislation works too restrictively, the
legislation should be modified to allow mortgagees to obtain defi-
ciencies in appropriate cases.
CONCLUSION
In the study reported in this Article, foreclosure by sale fre-
quently operated as a meaningless charade, producing the func-
tional equivalent of strict foreclosure, a process abandoned long
ago. Mortgagees acquired properties at foreclosure sales and resold
them at a significant profit in a large number of cases. Many trans-
actions involved single-family homes and resulted in the mortgagor
forfeiting his accumulated equity in the property and the mortgagee
reaping an unjust windfall. Although mortgagees are legally enti-
tled to collect deficiencies from the mortgagor when they are fairly
owed, the mortgagees in the sample rarely attempted to do so. In
short, this study indicates that foreclosure by sale is not producing
its intended results, and in many cases is yielding unjust and inequi-
table results.
Because this Article proposes major changes in the law of fore-
closure, further empirical study is needed to confirm these findings.
Although the sample of foreclosures examined was large enough to
yield many statistically significant conclusions, the study was subject
to some inherent, unavoidable limitations. Most importantly, the
sample was limited to transactions occurring in one county in up-
state New York during one year; therefore, drawing conclusions
about mortgage foreclosures and resales across the entire United
States requires caution.254 Further sampling in other locations and
252 People who default on automobile loans, however,presumably own other valua-
ble, nonexempt assets and often are the subjects of vigorous collection efforts for much
smaller amounts. See generally Shuchman, supra note 8.
253 Madway, supra note 12, at 150. Another reason why some mortgagees do not
pursue deficiencies might be the fear of adverse publicity. Id.
254 A further limitation that must be recognized is that some helpful information was
unavailable within the scope of this study. For example, because the mortgagees who
were interviewed would not allow access to their records, see supra note 113 and accom-
panying text, it was impossible to determine whether additional expenses were incurred
or income was received during the period between the foreclosure sale and later resale.
Expenses might include improvements to the property, see supra note 194, real estate
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of other time periods must determine whether this study's findings
and conclusions are representative of the nation as a whole.255 A
reasonable preliminary assumption, however, is that the study rep-
resents a valid microcosm of all United States foreclosures and re-
sales because no special historical events, economic conditions, or
population trends marked Onondaga County from 1979 through
1984.256
If a more comprehensive study confirms that foreclosure by sale
is working improperly and producing the unjust forfeitures associ-
ated with strict foreclosure, our law of mortgage foreclosure re-
quires immediate reform. This Article lays out a plan for reform.
The first step would require that mortgagees who purchase a prop-
erty at their own foreclosure sale and resell it at a profit within a
year return that profit to the mortgagor, just as if it were a surplus
generated at the foreclosure sale. This change alone would elimi-
nate the major injustice of the present system. At the same time,
further study and experimentation should be undertaken to improve
the foreclosure sale process, to make it more attractive to third par-
ties, and to generate spirited, competitive bidding. If this effort suc-
ceeds, foreclosure by sale would come closer to fulfilling its
underlying goals of producing the best possible price, reducing defi-
ciencies, and generating surpluses. Benefits would flow to mortga-
gors and mortgagees alike. If the public sale cannot be improved,
perhaps reformers should eliminate its wasteful aspects and allow
limited use of strict foreclosure, with adequate protections for mort-
brokerage commissions, post-foreclosure real estate taxes, and attorney's fees. Income
might be derived by renting out the property during the holding period.
Most of this information is not in the public record. The payment of real estate
taxes, however, is in the public record, but the structure of the Onondaga County
records made it difficult to distinguish current payments from payments of back taxes,
already charged to the mortgagor. Moreover, an informal sampling of real estate taxes
paid by mortgagees after foreclosure suggested that this item was generally not of great
magnitude. Other unavailable information included the resale price in the tax-exempt
transactions, see supra note 118, and the possibility that a mortgagor who owned land in
Onondaga County might have filed for bankruptcy in a court other than in the Bank-
ruptcy Court in the Northern District of New York, see supra note 120 and accompanying
text.
Although additional information would be desirable, the lack of such information is
probably not of sufficient magnitude to materially alter the conclusions derived from the
study.
255 For example, a study in a jurisdiction that allows statutory redemption or makes
extensive use of foreclosure by power of sale might obtain different results. Other dif-
ferences might appear in major metropolitan or primarily rural areas.
256 Indeed, as to its populace, the Syracuse area is "demographically representative
of the country as a whole," making it an ideal test market for new products. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 22, 1984, at BI, col. 3 (quoting Ira Weinblatt, senior vice president and director of
media planning for Dancer Fitzgerald, an advertising agency); see also SYRACUSE MEDIA
INC., THE SYRACUSE GUIDEBOOK '79, at 54 (1978), describing the Syracuse area as "a
miniature U.S.A."
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gagors. Finally, an effort should be made to determine why mortga-
gees fail to pursue deficiency judgments; if artificial and unnecessary
barriers in the law, such as antideficiency statutes, discourage the
pursuit of deficiency judgments, legislatures should remove them.
These reforms would restore foreclosure by sale as a fair and equita-
ble procedure, producing a just result for both mortgagors and
mortgagees.
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